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In 1920 Sidney M. Spiegel, then a forty-seven year old
widower, decided to set up a trust for his three children.
He wished to provide them with security and independence.
Accordingly he turned his fortune of about $1,000,000 into
a trust, with the children (or their descendants) to receive
the income and after he died the principal. As Mr. Spiegel
received none of the income from the trust, and as it was
irrevocable and unchangeable, he certainly did not think it
would be included in his estate when he died.
However, he overlooked the ingenuity of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue. The Commissioner claimed that when
the trust was established there was a possibility that all of
Mr. Spiegel's children and descendants might predecease
him, thus there was a "possibility of reverter", making the
entire trust includable in Mr. Spiegel's estate as a trust in-
tended to take effect upon his death. Although the initial
value (actuarially computed) of this possibility of reverter
was less than $4,000, and its value when Mr. Spiegel died
was zero, since he was survived by six children and grand-
children, the result of the inclusion of the trust in Mr. Spie-
gel's estate was an increased estate tax of about $450,000.
The Supreme Court upheld the Commissioner in assessing
the additional tax.'
* Member of the South Carolina and New York Bars. Member of firm of Bruton and
Bruton, Columbia, S. C.
NOTE: All references to the "Code" refer to the South Carolina Code
of 1942.
1. Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335 U. S. 701 (1949). This decision, how-
ever, was overruled by Congress. On October 25, 1949, §811 (c) of the
Internal Revenue Code was amended so that transfers prior to October
8, 1949, where the transferor did not expressly retain a reversion, are
not includable in the transferor's estate. The Spiegel executors were no
doubt overjoyed at this legislation, since it may give them a refund
claim for the tax paid on the trust. This legislation is discussed in a
later section of this article dealing with a "possibility of reversion".
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The actual decision in the Spiegel case is not nearly as
significant in estate planning as is the illustration it gives
of the readiness of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to in-
crease the estate tax whenever technical circumstances per-
mit an increase, regardless of the actual intent behind a
transaction. The decision means that a taxpayer must plan
every transaction with the technical rules and requirements
of the Bureau in mind-not merely in accordance with his
intention. In view of the attitude of the Bureau, as reflected
in this decision, a taxpayer certainly cannot be criticized
for making every possible legitimate arrangement for tax
minimization. The Supreme Court has said:
"The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount
of what otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether
avoid them, by means which the law permits, cannot
be doubted." 2
Judge Learned Hand of the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals recently said:
"Nobody owes any public duty to pay more than the
law demands; taxes are enforced exactions, not volun-
tary contributions." 3
The "law permits" two principal devices for reducing estate
taxes-the testamentary trust and the inter vivos gift. In ad-
dition, specific matters may be planned so that the tax may
be avoided. For example, if a testator wishes to create by will
a testamentary trust for his family, and wants to provide that
they shall be able to use the principal of the trust if they need
it, if he provides that his widow shall have the right to invade
the principal, the entire trust will be included in her estate,
but if he provides that an independent trustee shall have the
discretionary right to invade the principal for the family's
benefit, it will not be so included.4 The difference in the amount
of the tax to an estate of moderate size may amount to thou-
sands of dollars. Another example: a bequest to charities is
deductible in arriving at the taxable estate. But if the gift is
of a remainder interest, and the life income beneficiary has
2. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 465, 469 (1935).
3. Dissenting opinion in Commissioner v. Newman, 159 F. (2d) 848
(1947).
4. Estate of Walter E. Frew, 8 TC 1240 (1947).
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too unqualified a right to use the principal, the charitable de-
duction will not be allowed. This is illustrated by the recent
case of Henlsee v. Union Planters National Bank & Trust Co.5
There Mr. W. B. Williams died a bachelor in 1943 and left his
entire estate of about $500,000 to his aged mother for life, and
thereafter principally to charities. Since Mrs. Williams was
eighty-five years old, there was small value to her life interest.
As most of the remainder was to go to charities, the estate
tax would have been negligible. But Mr. Williams, despite
his mother having independent means and frugal tastes,
wanted to allow her the use of the principal. So he provided
that the trustees could pay out principal for the mother's
"pleasure, comfort and welfare". By making the power to in-
vade the principal so broad, the Court held, the entire amount
was taxable in his estate. A tax of over $35,000 was paid
merely because the unused power to invade the principal was
broader than is permissable.
Further illustrations of ways in which the estate tax may
be avoided by planning in connection with particular trans-
actions, are discussed in Chapter 5 of this article dealing spe-
cifically with estate tax reduction. There is always a temp-
tation to over-emphasize in a discussion of estate planning
the feature of estate tax reduction. It is more dramatic and
concrete and the figures for the amount saved may be large.
As a matter of fact, the term estate planning has been criti-
cized as connoting tax avoidance.6 However, estate tax
5. 335 U. S. 239, Jan. 3, 1949.
6. While the term "estate planning" is merely a modern designation
for the ancient practice of prudent men in setting their affairs in order,
unfortunately it has come into general use only since the estate tax
rates have been high and for that reason some writers have objected
to it on the ground that its connotation is principally that of tax avoid-
ance. Shattuck, An Estate Planner's Handbook, Foreword:
"The term 'Estate Planning' is in some disrepute... It has
been colored, moreover by motives of tax avoidance to an extent
which is unfortunate."
Joseph Trachtman in his monograph on "Estate Planning" in Current
Problems in Federal Taxation, published by the Practicing Law In-
stitute, says at p. 3:
"Sometimes 'estate planners,' in their zeal to show the uniqueness
of their services, have produced unnecessarily elaborate plan-
ning and have promoted doubtful tax schemes. 'Estate planning'
has thus acquired an undesirable secondary meaning-something
3
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avoidance or reduction is only one, albeit an important one,
feature of an estate plan.7
The basic objective of any testator is to leave his de-
pendents adequate financial security. This means first, the
realization of the full value of estate assets that are sold,
or otherwise disposed of, and it means secondly, that prolier
arrangements should be made so that the estate assets or
their proceeds will not be immediately consumed. A testator
certainly will not wish his family to be rich one year and
poor the next. Arrangements to provide a family with regu-
lar income throughout their lives, or perhaps until children
are grown, is probably preferred. However, no matter what
arrangements are made to provide financial security for de-
pendents, it is an essential part of such arrangements to
reduce the administration expenses and estate taxes to a
minimum.
In the problem of full realization of estate assets that
are sold, the only asset which might present difficulty in a
sale is that of a business interest or of stock of a closely held
corporation. Accordingly the first question discussed is that
of the effective disposition of a business interest. This asset
is normally not liquid and it could increase enormously the
estate taxes and administration expenses. By arranging for
the disposition of this normally unliquid asset, prior to his
death, a testator relieves his administrator of a difficult
task and also assures his estate a sufficient amount of cash
to meet the taxes and administration expenses. The best
arrangement a testator can make for the disposition after
his death of his business interest or closely held stock is the
so-called "buy and sell agreement" with the most likely
buyer. Such an agreement in no way interferes with the
owner's use and control of the business interest or stock
during his lifetime, as it is operative only upon his death.
However, it assures his estate administrator of the sale of
this usually unliquid asset and it will supply all or a part of
which has to do primarily with tax avoidance. The title of this
monograph was not chosen by the author, who dislikes it and
used it only because it seems to be on the way to attaining de-
sirable connotations."
7. All estate planning problems dealt with in this article with the
exception of federal estate taxes apply irrespective of the amount
of the estate. The federal estate tax, however, applies only to estates
of $60,000 and larger.
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the cash needed to pay the taxes and administration ex-
penses. Such an agreement may also have value for tax pur-
poses, as it would fix the value of the asset for estate tax
purposes. In the case of an employee however, the agree-
ment should not give the buyer the right to purchase the
stock at below its market value, as the unpurchased incre-
ment of value will be considered taxable income to the em-
ployee. This matter will be discussed in more detail later. If,
on the other hand, a buy and sell agreement is not made,
other means for the disposition of a business interest may be
provided by a will, although for several reasons, which will
be mentioned, such arrangements are not as satisfactory as
an agreement would be.
The second matter which will be discussed is the prob-
lem of arrangements to provide the necessary financial se-
curity for dependents. If the estate assets or their proceeds
are paid out immediately to the dependents it is conceivable
that they will be lost or consumed. On the other hand, if
they are not to be paid immediately, some form of testa-
mentary trust must be used. The testamentary trust is the
only way (aside from insurance) principal funds of an
estate may be withheld from immediate use or consumption
by dependents. The testamentary trust is also a useful de-
vice in over-all estate tax reductions, as the later chapter on
that subject will show. But here the only matter considered
is its use as a means of furnishing financial security to de-
pendents. There are some problems involved in its estab-
lishment, such as the investment powers to be given the
trustee, whether the trustee shall be a corporate one or an
individual, delineation of the rights of the income benefici-
aries and the remaindermen and the like. Certainly the most
important problem is the question of whether or not the
fiduciary's investment powers should be charted by the tes-
tator. In the absence of directions by the testator or trustor,
a fiduciary can only make investments in conformity with
the laws of the state in which he is acting. In many states
the responsibility is placed on the fiduciary8 but in this state
the legislator has taken over the responsibility by listing the
8. This is the so-called Massachusetts or "prudent man rule". Here
the fiduciary is permitted to make investments in accordance with a
policy of "soundness" which a "prudent man" would utilize in making
non-speculative investments for himself.
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investments which may be made 9
Life insurance is quite an important subject in planning
an estate. In view of its importance it is discussed in a
separate chapter. To the extent that estate assets consist
of life insurance no testamentary trust is necessary, as the
insurance company, under settlement options will retain the
principal fund and pay it out in the form of interest or prin-
cipal and interest, such as an annuity, as may be elected by
the owner of the insurance policy. In addition to its useful-
ness in supplying an income to dependents, life insurance
may also be useful. for financing business or stock purchases
in connection with buy and sell agreements, and in supply-
ing the cash needed for the payment of administration ex-
penses and taxes.
The second part of this article deals with the ways in which
administration expenses and estate taxes may be reduced. In
essence the reduction of administration expenses is accom-
plished by eliminating the need for constant judicial proceed-
ings for the guidance of fiduciaries. The legitimate reductions
in the estate taxes are principally accomplished, aside from the
ways in which particular transactions may be arranged, by the
use of two tax saving techniques. The first of these is the
testamentary trust and the second is the inter vivos gift. Tied
in closely with the testamentary trust is the marital deduction.
This is a substantial tax benefit applicable to married persons
only and introduced into the Internal Revenue Code for the
first time last year. The inter vivos gift is complicated by rea-
son of its being effective during the life of a grantor, rather
than, as in the case of a testamentary trust, at his death. All
of the complications have to do with whether the gift is suf-
ficiently removed from his death so as to be considered an
independent transaction.
We will first, however, consider the business disposition.
1. DISPOSITION OF BUSINESS INTERESiT:
(a) The Problem:
In the case of a sole proprietorship, when death strikes,
9. §9051 of the South Carolina Code of 1942 as amended by Acts
of 1947 and 1948. All references to the "Code" refer to the South
Carolina Code of 1942.
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the wheels of a business stop. ° A legal representative is not
allowed to continue the business," but may fulfill outstand-
ing contracts. 2 If he continues the business anyway, he is
personally liable for any obligations of the business there-
after incurred;13 he is also personally responsible for any
loss of the business;14 and he cannot claim any compen-
sation therefor as a legal representative, no matter how
profitably the business has been operated. He may, how-
ever, in South Carolina, bring a separate action for that
purpose.15
If the business of the decedent was done in the form of
a partnership, rather than as a sole proprietorship, his death
dissolves the partnership.10 If the surviving partner or part-
ners carry on the business, they do so for their sole account.
Furthermore, they have no prior right or option to purchase
the deceased partner's interest from his legal representative
or heirs. A provision in a partnership agreement that the
death of a partner does not dissolve the firm may be hazard-
ous, especially in a limited partnership, since it could cause
the partnership to be taxed as a corporation. 7
You do not have this problem of business continuance in
the case of a corporation, as it continues despite a principal
10. Laikin and Lichter, Survivor-Purchase Agreements, 26 Taxes
931 (October, 1948). In footnote 1, Lord Mansfield is quoted as having
said in the Old English case of Barker v. Parker, I. T. R., 286 (1786):
"A trade is not transmissible; it is put to an end by the death of
the trader. Executors eo nomine do not usually carry on a trade;
if they do so, they run great risk; and without the protection of
the Court of Chancery, they act very unwisely in carrying it on."
- 11. Carolina Life Insurance Company v. Arrowsmith, 176 S. E. 728,
174 S. C. 161:
... There is no authority in this state for an administrator to
* carry on the business previously conducted by the deceased."
12. Glenn v. Worthy 169 S. C. 263, 168 S. E. 705.
13. Carolina Life Insurance Co. v. Arrowsmith, supra; Dahlberg v.
Brown, 198 S. C. 1, S. E. (2d) 284.
14. Ex Parte Coleman, 98 S. C. 420, 82 S. E. 674; Glenn v. Worthy,
supra; Carolina Life Insurance Co. v. Arrowsmith, supra.
15. §9018 of the Code; Ruff v. Summer's Ex'rs, 4 Desaus. Eq.
529; Glenn v. Worthy, supra; Carolina Life Insurance Co. v. Arrow-
smith, supra.
16. Jones v. McMichal, 12 Rich. 176; Crane on Partnerships, §77,
and cases there cited; see also Crane supra, §225.
17. See Reg. 111, §29.3794-4.
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stockholder's death. You do, however, have the problem of
continuity of management and of the stock being general
assets and subject to sale to pay taxes and creditors. Or the
stock may be distributable to the distributees or legatees of
the decedent; thus, harmonious management relations, or
the important element of "control" may be lost.
(b) A Solution-the Buy and Sell Agreement:
The Usual Buy and Sell Agreement. The most effective so-
lution to the problem of a business disposition or "control"
continuance is for the owner of the business to make during
his life a contract to sell it at his death to the most likely
buyer. The buyer agrees to buy and the owner agrees to sell,
but the agreement is operative only when the owner dies.
This type of agreement is known as a buy and sell agree-
ment. In the case of a sole proprietorship the most likely
buyer is a key-employee; in a partnership, the prospective
buyers are probably limited to the surviving partner or
partners; where the business interest is stock of a closely
held corporation, the most likely buyers are the other impor-
tant stockholders.
The Stock Liquidation Agreement. If there are many im-
portant stockholders so that agreements between them to pur-
chase and sell the stockholdings of each would be impractical,
a stock liquidation agreement between each stockholder and
the corporation might be considered. The corporation would
agree with each stockholder that it would purchase and retire
his stock upon his death. Such an agreement, however, nor-
mally should not be made if any other arrangement is feasible,
as it presents several difficult questions. Unless the corpora-
tion has the power to purchase its own stock, such an agree-
ment would be ultra vires and could not be enforced. 18 More-
over, the corporation can make the purchase only from sur-
plus. This brings up what may be a serious tax difficulty.
If there is a substantial surplus and it is used to purchase
18. The authority of corporations to acquire their own stock is not
specifically given by the statutes of this state. The statute does, how-
ever, (§§7685 and 7745) impliedly give a South Carolina corporation
this power by providing that the corporation shall have a lien on any
stock subscribed until it is fully paid for. By giving the corporation
a lien on the stock necessarily implied is the power to enforce the lien
and thus acquire ownership of the stock. See Creech v. South Carolina
Public Service Authority, 20 S. E. (2d) 645, 200 S. C. 127.
8
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stock of a deceased stockholder, the Bureau of Internal Rev-
enue may contend that the surplus accumulation is unrea-
sonable and should be taxed under Sec. 102 of the Internal
Revenue Code. (Sec. 102 of the Internal Revenue Code pro-
vides for a penalty tax of from 27 % to 38 % of any sur-
plus deemed by the tax authorities to be unreasonably large.
The tax is on the surplus of a corporation "formed or availed
of" to avoid surtax on stockholders; the Statute is applied
however, only where surplus had been accumulated beyond
the "reasonable needs" of the corporation.) Rather large ac-
cumulations of surplus are generally permitted for the reason
that a substantial surplus may be needed for corporate ex-
pansion or protection. This reason could not be advanced to
justify a surplus used to purchase stock from the estate of
a deceased stockholder.
Another objection to the corporation purchasing the"
stock for retirement, where the corporation is family owned,
is that the payment for the stock may be treated as a "divi-
dend" and the entire amount taxed to the stockholder's estate
as ordinary income. The theory of the Bureau would be that
since the remaining stock is owned by the family of the de-
ceased stockholder, the purchase and retirement of the stock
does not affect control and was not a true purchase and sale.
This theory however, could not properly be applied where
the purchase and retirement of the stock would affect con-
trol of the corporation outside of a family group.
Also, if the corporation purchases the stock, the tax basis
of the remaining outstanding stock and the corporate assets
in the hands of stockholders, would not include the payment
by the corporation in purchasing the stock, although the
value of the stock would be greater and the cost of the assets
to the corporation would be more. Thus, if the remaining
stock, or the corporate assets in the hands of stockholders
should later be sold, or otherwise disposed of, the income
tax would be substantially greater. However, there may be
a partial compensation in that if corporate earnings dis-
tributed to the stockholders are used to make the purchase,
the money for the purchase will be reduced by the amount
of the individual income tax thereon, which would not be
true if the corporation made the purchase itself. Where the
.stock is purchased by the corporation to hold, and not for
retirement, many of the above objections do not apply.,
9
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Life Insurance to Fund the Agreement. The cash necessary
for the purchase by the partner, key-employee, stockholder
or corporation can be raised through insurance on the life
of the owner. As a matter of fact, it would be unwise for
any person, unless he is quite wealthy, to enter into a sur-
vivor-purchase agreement that is not adequately funded
with insurance, since the partner, employee or stockholder
might find himself with a heavy financial obligation and no
cash with which to meet it.19 This is not to say however, that
the insurance policy must be owned by a party to the agree-
ment. An obligation to purchase the business interest or
stock of an associate requires merely that funds should be
available for that purpose; it does not necessarily mean that
the buyer must own the insurance. Nevertheless, if the party
to the agreement does not own the insurance policy, he
should have adequate assurance that the insurance funds
will be available to him to purchase the interest of the de-
cedent. This situation might arise where there are two stock-
holders of a corporation, and they have an agreement
whereby the stock of the first one to die will be sold to the
other, but the corporation purchases the insurance to fund
the agreement. In this case the surviving stockholder is obli-
gated to purchase the stock of the decedent but since the
corporation owned the insurance the funds for the purchase
are paid to and held by the corporation. Thus, the surviv-
ing stockholder should have a contract whereby the funds
will be loaned to him by the corporation for the purpose of
buying the stock. It would make no difference whether or
not the stock was posted as collateral security for the loan.
If the corporation has surplus and the stockholders agree
to the loan contract, its validity could not be questioned.
But where the parties to the buy and sell agreement do
own the insurance, each party to the agreement should pur-
chase and own the policy on the life of the other party or
parties to the agreement. If the insured "directly or in-
directly" paid any of the premiums for the insurance on his
own life (subsequent to January 10, 1941) or held an
19. See Harwood, Disposition of Business Interest, proceedings of
Probate and Trust Law Divisions, American Bar Association (1946),
p. 16.
10
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"incident of ownership"2 over that policy, the proceeds are
included in his taxable estate.2'
The problem of when premium payments may be held as
indirectly paid by the insured has been perplexing. The most
obvious situation of an indirect premium payment is that by
a spouse or child with money furnished by the insured.2 2 It has
been held that where a partnership paid premiums for insur-
ance on the life of a partner, such payments were indirectly
made by the partner.23 In 1940 it was held in Lekman v. Com-
missioner4 that where two brothers established reciprocal
trusts for each other, each indirectly established a trust for
himself. Until 1947 there was some fear that this doctrine of
reciprocity might be applied to life insurance acquired to fund
a buy and sell agreement, and that the payment of premiums
for insurance on the life of a partner or business associate
might be held an indirect payment of premiums on a similar
policy of insurance on one's own life. In 1947, however, the
Bureau took official recognition of this danger and ruled5
that it will not attempt to tax both the insurance proceeds
where there are reciprocal policies on the lives of partners
and the value of the business interest it is designed to pur-
chase. The rulings probably will not afford protection if the
partnership or business itself owns the policy or pays the
premiums. If insurance on the life of a stockholder is owned
and paid for by the corporation, there is only slight danger
that it will be considered an indirect premium payment by the
stockholder-except when the stockholder owns all or sub-
stantially all of the stock of the corporation and the premiums
are attributed to him under the alter ego theory. If the in-
surance is included in the estate of the deceased partner or
associate, the income tax position of the survivor or sur-
vivors is precarious. If the business interest or stock so ac-
quired is disposed of, the cost basis may not include the in-
20. "Incident of ownership" includes the right to change the bene-
ficiary, the right to assign or borrow on the policy, the right to con-
vert and the like.
21. 1. R. C., §811 (g) (2) and Reg. 105, §81.27.
22. Reg. 105, §81.27 (a).
23. Legallet v. Commissioner, 41 BTA 294 (1940).
24. 109 Fed. (2d) 99 (CCA 2, 1940).
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surance proceeds. 26
If the agreement is funded with insurance owned by the
parties to the buy and sell agreement on the lives of each
other, the agreement should also provide that the survivor
or survivors shall have the right to purchase (for its cash
surrender value) from the estate of the deceased partner or
business associate any policy or policies of insurance which
the estate owns on the survivor's lives. A similar right to
purchase the insurance on their own lives if the agreement
is terminated for any reason should also be provided.
(c) Tax Aspects of the Buy and Sell Agreement:
Under certain circumstances the purchase price fixed in
the agreement will be binding on the Bureau of Internal
Revenue as the estate tax value of the business interest or
stock so sold. This could be a great advantage to the ad-
ministrator, in that it eliminates what might be an exceed-
ingly tiresome and long drawn out dispute with the govern-
ment. On the other hand, the purchaser, if he is an em-
ployee, will find that to the extent he has bought the in-
terest or stock for less than its market value he has received
taxable income by reason of the bargain purchase, and will
have to pay tax on the benefit at the ordinary rates.
The Effect of a Buy and Sell Agreement on Value. The val-
uation of a business interest is required for state inheritance
and federal estate taxes. The valuation is most complex and
the result is inconclusive until the return has been finally
audited. A recent analysis of all litigated cases concerning
the value of a partnership interest, where there was no buy
and sell agreement, shows that the average time consumed
in such valuation dispute is slightly over five years.27 The
viewpoint of the estate tax collector has been referred to as
similar to Dr. Johnson's remarks of the worth of a deceased
friend's business.
26. In Legallet v. Commissioner, 41 BTA 294 (1940) two partners
allowed the partnership to buy the insurance and pay the premiums
therefor. The Board held that the cost basis of the interest of the
deceased partner, acquired by the surviving partner under a buy and
sell agreement, did not include insurance paid to the widow of the
deceased partner. The effect of this holding is, from a tax viewpoint,
to disregard the fact that the insurance proceeds were intended as part
payments for the indivisible partnership interest.
27. Advanced underwriting service by Insurance Research and Re-
view Service.
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"Boswell, somewhat maliciously, repeats 'a very good
story, which, if not precisely exact, is certainly char-
acteristical' namely, that 'when the sale of Thrale's brew-
ery was going forward, Johnson (one of Thrale's Execu-
tors) appeared bustling about, with an ink-pen in his
buttonhole, like an exciseman; and on being asked what he
really considered to be the value of the property which
was to be disposed of, answered, 'We are not here to, sell
a parcel of boilers and vats, but the potentiality of grow-
ing rich, beyond the dreams of avarice'." Samuel Johnson,
a Biography, by Joseph Wood Krutch, pp. 504-5. 28
As this highly difficult and uncertain matter of valuation
can usually be avoided by the making of a buy and sell
agreement, such an agreement should, by all means, be
made, as it is justifiable for that reason alone. The subject
is comparatively new and the applicable legal principles are
not fully developed. However, some conclusions may be
drawn.
Where there is no family relationship involved, that is,
where the agreement is made at arm's-length, and where
the owner definitely obligates himself to sell the business in-
terest or stock at his death, and the other party definitely
obligates himself to buy, the price fixed is a "pegged value"
and will be binding for estate tax purposes.29 Where, how-
28. Joseph Trachtman's monograph, referred to in footnote (6) supra.
29. Matthew v. Commissioner, 3 TC 525. In Wilson v. Bowers, 57
Fed. (2d) 628 (CCA 2, 1932) and in Lomb v. Sugten, 82 Fed. (2d)
166 (CCA 2, 1936) it was held that stock-purchase agreements which
provided for a value of considerably less than the market value of
the stock at the time of the decedent's death, were binding upon the
Bureau. In each of these cases the prospective purchaser was not bound
to purchase the stock but merely had an option to buy it at the agreed
figure. The Court viewed the matter as of the date of death, and not
as of the date the agreement was made. The Court found the agreements
to sell were specifically enforceable. The effect of a buy and sell agree-
ment value for estate tax purposes has never come before the United
States Supreme Court, but in Helvering v. Salvage, 297 U. S. 106 (1936)
it was held that an outstanding option agreement was binding for the
purpose of determining value for income tax purposes.
In the more recent cases of Hoffman v. Commissioner, 2 TC 1160
(1943); Estate of Edwin R. Armstrong, 3 TCM 77 (1944) and Matthews
v. Commissioner, 3 TC 525, the Tax Court has said that a restrictive
agreement is not binding upon the Commissioner unless it gives the
prospective purchaser an unqualified right to buy the stock, and re-
quires that it be available at the owner's death. See Varney, How Re-
13
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ever, there is a family relationship or the agreement is ef-
fective only at death, and does not restrict the owner's right
of disposal during his lifetime, the courts will probably con-
sider the agreement as merely a substitute for a testamen-
tary disposition, and not effective for estate tax valuations.80
Because of complications arising in connection with family
arrangements, the so-called "business purpose doctrine"
may be applied, under which the agreement will not be
considered binding for tax purposes unless made for a busi-
ness purpose.3
Moreover, if the agreement applies only if the owner's legal
representative elects to sell, and gives the prospective pur-
chaser merely a prior right of purchase, it is not binding.32 A
restrictive agreement of this kind, while not binding in fixing
value, nevertheless is a depressing factor which should be con-
sidered in the fixing of value.33 An agreement to sell at a cer-
tain price upon death is not binding as to value for an inter
vivs gift.34
Income to an Employee. If the agreement is made with an
employee and provides for a sales price which is not, in
measure at least, fairly reflective of the actual market value
when the agreement becomes effective, the difference be-
tween the sales price under the agreement and the actual
market value will probably be regarded as additional com-
strictive Agreements Determine Stock and Partnetrship Values, Taxes,
June, 1948, p. 516; Harwood, Disposition of Business Interest, Proceed-
ings of Probate and Trust Law Divisions, American Bar Association
(1946), p. 16.
If there is a real reason for the agreement, that is to say, if the
agreement to sell the stock or business interest can be supported by
adequate consideration, the agreement will be held binding despite
family relationships. Commissioner v. Childs, 147 Fed. (2d) 368 (CCA
3, 1945), and Bensel v. Commissioner, 100 Fed. (2d) 639 (CCA 3, 1938).
30. See Hoffman v. Commissioner, 2 TC 1160 (1943); Matthews v.
Commissioner, 3 TC 525.
31. See Gutkin and Beck, Restrictive Stock Agreements and Estate
Tax Minimization, Taxes, May, 1947, p. 413. See footnote (29) supra.
32. Koch v. Commissioner, 28 BTA 363; Krauss v. U. S., 140 Fed.
(2d) 510 (CCA 5, 1944).
33. Worcester County Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 134 Fed. (2d)
578 (CCA 1, 1943).
34. Commissioner v. McCann, 146 Fed. (2d) 385 (CCA 2, 1944);
Spitzer v. Commissioner, 153 Fed. (2d) 967 (CCA 8, 1946); Nee v.
Katz, 163 Fed. 256 (CCA 8, 1947).
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pensation to the employee, and the price fixed will not be
binding for estate tax purposes.5 If the difference between
the price to the employee and the market value is considered
additional compensation, that difference will be taxed to
the employee as ordinary income. 6 If the difference is not
considered additional compensation, the cost basis to the
employee will undoubtedly be what he actually paid for the
stocky Furthermore, this result cannot be avoided by be-
queathing the stock to someone else subject to a right of
purchase by the employee. s Probably an agreement with an
employee for a sale at a price lower than market value is
inadvisable.
(d) Other Solutions for a Business Disposition:
Option or Prior Purchase Right. If an inter vivos arrange-
ment is not desired, provisions may be included in a will so as
to give key-employees, a surviving partner or partners, or
stockholders, the option to purchase the business interest of
the testator at a stated price or at a price to be reached by a
formula. Or the will may give such persons a prior right of
purchase for a certain length of time. The price fixed for
such purchase, if it differs materially from the market value
of such business interest at the time of the death of the
owner, will probably not be accepted by the Bureau as the
value of such interest for the estate tax. In the first place it
applies only if there is a sale, and in the second place, it
is not in effect during the lifetime of the owner. The differ-
ence between the sales price and the market value of the
business interest may be considered a bequest, but probably
it will be considered a sale at the lower figure and although
35. Certainly if the employee was given the right to purchase the
stock or business interest during the lifetime of the employer, any
difference between the market value of the stock, or business interest,
when it is acquired by the employee and the price which the employee
is required to pay, would be considered additional compensation and
taxed to the employee as ordinary income. Reg. 111, §29.22 (a)-1;
Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U. S. 177 (1945). There is no justification
for the application of a, different rule where the option is effective at
the death of the owner. See Van Dusen v. Commissioner, 166 Fed.
(2d) 647 (CCA 9, 1948), where the option could have been binding
on the estate of the owner for five years.
36. Commissioner v. Smith 324 U. S. 177 (1945).
37. Mack v. Commissioner, 148 Fed. (2d) 62 (CCA 3, 1945).
38. Delone v. Commissioner, 6 TC 1188.
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it will not be effective for estate tax purposes, will have the
basis of the low sales price.8 9 However, if the sale is to an
,employee, the difference will probably be regarded as income
to the employee, and its basis will be its value.
Aside from the fact that such provisions do not dispose
of the difficult valuation question, they are not as satis-
factory in that they do not furnish any assurance that the
assets will be conserved in the estate, since the option or
right of purchase may or may not be exercised.
The Estate a Limited Partner. Where the owner does not
wish the business to be sold, other arrangements can be
made. If it is an interest in a partnership and the other
partners agree, a new and limited partnership may be
formed and the testator's interest may continue with the
estate participating as a limited partner. Of course, specific
authorization to that effect would have to be contained in
the will. The executor, in the absence of authorization would
be obliged to liquidate the interest. Funds would also have
to be available elsewhere to pay the proportionate part of
the taxes and administration expenses without liquidation
of this investment.
The Business May be SpecificalI Bequeathed. If the busi-
ness is conducted as a sole proprietorship, it may be spe-
cifically bequeathed or the will may create a trust of the
business for named beneficiaries and authorize the trustees
to continue to operate the business. If the business is to be
continued by trustees, their powers must be carefully de-
fined. They must be authorized to spend whatever funds are
required in the business, and if it is intended for them to have
additional compensation for the continuance, that must be
specified. It has been held that even though a business was
continued by trustees pursuant to a court order, neverthe-
less, the trustees were not entitled to additional compensa-
tion.40 It may be advisable also to authorize incorporation of
the business. This could be done tax free and it would pro-
tect the trustees against individual liabilities.
Periodic Review .Whether the arrangements are by inter
vivos agreement, or by provisions in a will, it is very desirable
39. See Mack v. Commissioner, supra.
40. Jones v. Jones, 39 S. C. 245, 17 S. E. 587, rehearing denied 39
S. C. 247, 17 S. E. 802.
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to either review the matter periodically or else have the
purchase price reached by use of an agreed formula, rather
than provide a fixed price. Circumstances might change
considerably between the time of the making of the agree-
ment or will and the time of death.
Usually the only serious problem presented on the full
realization of estate assets concerns the appropriate dis-
position of a business interest. With this matter taken care
of, where it is present, the next problem is arrangements for
the continuation of support and maintenance for depend-
ents.
2. THE TESTAMENTARY TRUST-FINANCIAL SECURITY FOR DE-
PENDENTS:
The testamentary trust is an effective device for the re-
duction of over-all estate taxes, but its use for that purpose
is discussed later in this article. Here the discussion of the
testamentary trust is confined to its use for the furnishing of
financial security to dependents.
The function of the executor is solely to collect the as-
sets, convert them into cash if necessary and to pay the
creditors and taxes, and to make distributions to the lega-
tees or distributees. The function of the testamentary
trustee, on the other hand, is to hold and manage the trust
assets and use them, for the benefit of the named benefici-
aries; to invest the uninvested portion of the trust fund and,
where authorized to do so, to continue the operation and
management of the decedent's business.
Investment Powers of a Fiduciary. Legatees or distributees
are often inexperienced in investments. Where a trustee is
limited to the "legal" list of investments, experience is not
particularly important as the legislature has, to a large
measure, assumed the investment responsibility. 41 However,
where a trustee is given investment powers beyond those
specified in the Code, competency and experience in making
sound investments are qualities that are second only to hon-
esty. Dependents are usually more interested in regular in-
come than they are in principal. A too cautious investment
policy may be very hard on the income beneficiaries, and
the "loss" from an overly-cautious investment policy may be
41. §9051 of the 1942 Code, as amended by the Acts of 1947 and 1948.
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substantial. For example, a 4% return on $300,000. pro-
duces the same income as a 3% return on $400,000. On the
other hand, a speculative investment policy may result in a
substantial part of the principal fund being actually lost.
The primary problem of investment policy for a person who
wishes to provide adequately for his dependents is whether
or not he wishes a fiduciary to be limited to the statutory
list of legal investments.
A trustee, unless authorized to make investments be-
yond those in the "legal" list, cannot even retain invest-
ments of the decedent, or of a predecessor trustee, which
are not "legal" trust investments. 2 Neither can he sell any
portion of the trust property, unless he is authorized, direct-
ly or impliedly, to do so, or unless the property is not a
proper investment and he is not authorized to retain it. 43
Normally a trustee has full powers to vote securities held in
the trust but the power to give proxies and to participate in
corporate reorganizations will probably be denied. 4  There
is however, some belief to the contrary.45 Usually the lega-
tees or distributees of a decedent are his widow and chil-
dren, and they probably do not have investment experience.
Also the decedent may not wish them to have the burden
and responsibility of investing and managing substantial
sums of money. Therefore, unless a legatee or distributee is
experienced in making investments or unless he is closely
advised by someone in whom the testator has confidence,
it may be well to make the bequest in trust, and this is al-
ways true where there are minor children involved.
42. See Vol. 31, Bogert Trusts, §686 and cases there cited. The com-
mon law rule in this regard, in force in this state, is well stated in the
case of Mobley v. Phinizy, 155 S. E. 73 (Ga.)
"The power of a trustee to retain investments other than those
authorized by law to be made by the trustee, received from
the creator of the trust, in the absence of statute or a contrary
provision contained in the instrument creating the trust, is
not different from his power to make such investments."
See Bass v. Adams, 161 S. E. 697, 163 S. C. 381.
43. Thomason v. Peake, 17 S. E. 45, 38 S. C. 440 rehearing denied,
17 S.E. 725, 38 S. C. 440; Mauldin v. Mauldin, 85 S. E. 60, 101 S. C. 1.
44. Weston v. Weston, 41 S. E. (2d) 372, 210 S. C. 1; Epworth
Orphanage v. Long, 36 S. E. (2d) 37, 207 S. C. 384.
45. Spotts, Duty of Fiduciary to Vote Stock, proceeding of Probate
and Trust Law Decisions of the American Bar Association (1944), p. 3,
Vol. 79 at page 289.
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Selection of a Trustee. Many men dislike the creation of a
trust-either testamentary, or inter vivos. One difficulty is
the selection of an appropriate trustee. Where broad and
discretionary powers are given to the trustee, the trustee'A
judgment is very important. Where such powers are not
given, the advantage of the trust arrangement may be large-
ly lost. Where there are minor children involved the trustee
is usually given considerable discretion as to the distribution
of funds. Many testators wish to limit discretionary powers
to fiduciaries named in the will. Other testators, particularly
where the trustee is a corporate one, wish to have some
surviving family member exercise the discretion. A testator
may wish his widow to have the right to use all or a portion
of the principal. The power to distribute the trust funds,
whether income or principal, to a beneficiary is a matter
requiring judgment and discretion, where it is often desir-
able or even necessary that the trustee be very close to the
family. 6 These problems may be resolved by the naming of
two trustees; only one of them to have the discretionary
powers mentioned. The cost will be no greater since in this
state two or more trustees must share the single commis-
sion. 47 If two trustees are named, it may be desirable for one
to be corporate and the other an individual. 47a
While an individual trustee will probably be preferred
for the exercise of the discretionary powers, there is no
doubt that a corporate trustee is in a better position to make
investments. It does not get sick, or go away on vacations.
46. Most discretionary powers given to a trustee, or to a person who
may direct the trustee, are personal. Bogert on Trust, Chapter 9, p.
314 et seq. If discretionary powers are given to an individual trustee,
they do'not survive the trustee's death. General powers may be inter-
preted to go with the office of trustee. It is difficult to distinguish be-
tween powers that will be held to be personal and do not survive the
trustee's death, and those which go with the office. A power to accumu-
late trust income for a minor will probably be held to be personal,
whereas, a power of sale will be held to apply to the office, see Bogert,
supra.
47. §9019 of the 1942 Code.
47a. Since in this state, there is some question as to whether the
corporation will succeed to the title of the entire trust property upon
the death of the individual trustee (see Karesh, Devolution of Interest
in Trust Estates, 1 S. C. LAw QUARTE-RLY 367) it probably will be wise
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Where an individual trustee alone is named, it is desirable
to provide for his successor. If this is not done the court will
appoint a successor who may be a stranger to the family.
48
Where a corporate trustee is named the problem of succes-
sor does not arise. Many people feel, however, that a cor-
porate trustee may be too impersonal and coldly objective
in its trust administration.
Delineation of Rights Between Income Beneficiary and Re-
mainderman. It is often felt that a trustee is inclined to re-
solve any doubt on allocation or apportionment in favor of
the remainderman and against the income beneficiary. 49 Of
course, it would be expected that a trustee would do this
48. See §9046 of the Code.
49. The problem of allocating and apportioning between principal and
income is one of great difficulty, and has been the source of much liti-
gation (see Chapter 15, of Bogert's Hornbook on Trusts, at p.'430).
This question arises frequently where stock dividends are paid, also
dividends of so-called wasting-asset corporations, and it frequently
arises where a trustee forecloses a defaulted mortgage. Many states
have statutes specifically covering these situations, but in this state
there are no such statutes. In the absence of a statutory direction, or
of a specific authorization, in the case of stock dividends, the allocation
has produced three different views: The so-called "Massachusetts Rule"
allocates the entire dividend to income. The so-called "Kentucky Rule"
allocates the entire dividend to principal. The so-called "Pennsylvania
Rule" apportions the value of the stock dividend between principal and
income by attributing to income the portion of the value of the stock
representing a distribution of earnings and attributing the balance of
the value of the stock to principal. Apparently the latter rule is followed
in this state. (See Bogert, supra. p. 451, footnote 68). Dividends by
a wasting-asset corporation in the absence of specific authorization,
must be attributed to income. In the case of foreclosed mortgages,
some Courts have worked out a very complicated formula where the
total amount received by the trustees are apportioned by taking a per-
centage for principal representing the ratio of the total amount re-
ceived to the total amount due, principal and interest. Thus, if the
total amount due is $2,000-$1,500 principal and $500 interest, and
the total amount received is $1,000, the ratio of the total received
is one-half of the total due. Therefore, applying the ratio of 50% to
the principal due of $1,500 results in $750 of the amount received be-
ing attributed to principal. Applying the ratio of 50% to the $500
interest due gives $250 as attributable to income. The formula is widely
used by trustees in some states (Matter of Chapal, 269 N. Y. 464;
Matter of Otis, 276 N. Y. 101), but apparently the question has not
yet arisen in this state. The proper allocation of amounts spent for
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since, except for a surcharge based on loss due to improper
investments, amounts improperly paid out are gone, where-
as, income improperly held is still available. But most trusts
are for the primary benefit of the income beneficiaries; the
usual trustor has more interest in being assured that the in-
come beneficiaries are amply provided for, than that the
remaindermen will receive adequate distributions at the ter-
mination of the trust. It is also likely that a trustee will be
more conservative in investments than the trustor wishes
since the trustee is naturally concerned primarily with the
safety and conservation of the corpus, rather than with the
adequacy of the income. Statutory restrictions on the invest-
ment powers of a trustee, requirements as to segregation of
trust funds and the like have to do entirely with the pro-
tection of the principal fund. There are no statutes or rules
of law designed to aid the income beneficiary.
This problem can be alleviated somewhat by a provision
in the trust, or in the testamentary paragraph dealing with
the trust, providing that the income beneficiaries are the
chief objects of the trustor's interest, and that doubts shall
be resolved in their favor. Such a provision could be in-
cluded along the following lines:
My primary purpose in creating this trust is to pro-
vide adequately for the named life beneficiaries. I
therefore direct that in the administration of this trust
my trustees, to the fullest extent consistent with law,
shall resolve any doubts in apportionment in favor of
income. No remainderman of this trust or guardian or
anyone claiming for, under, by or through a remainder-
man, shall question the apportionments made by my
trustees, in the manner aforesaid.
If the trustees are given the discretionary authority to
invade the principal of the trust for the income benefici-
aries, no provisions for liberality in apportionment between
income and principal are needed. If the trustees are directed
to exercise their discretionary authority to invade principal
in a manner favorable to the income beneficiaries, the
Bureau of Internal Revenue may question whether in such
a case the discretion of the trustees is "untrammeled". This
could cause the entire trust fund to be included, for federal
estate tax purposes, in the estate of the life beneficiaries.
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Children. Where children are involved it is very desirable
that benefits to them should be trusteed during their minor-
ity, otherwise the benefit must be paid to the parents or to
a guardian on the child's behalf. If both parents are alive,
they are joint natural guardians of the person and of the
property of their minor children, and if one parent only
survives, that surviving parent is by law the guardian.60 A
parent may appoint a guardian of the person and of the
property by will or deed, effective only when both parents
are dead.51 Such an appointive guardian must make an an-
nual accounting to the Probate Court ;52 but a surviving par-
ent is under no such obligation. If a parent of the children
is not alive and a guardian has not been appointed by such
parents, then property of the child can only be turned over
to a guardian appointed by the Probate Court.5 The guar-
dian so appointed is required to make annual accountings
and is limited like a trustee in investments of the minor's
property. Of course, a guardian is authorized by law to pay
out such amount as is necessary for the infant's proper sup-
port, education and welfare.
A testator should not be misled by the thought that the
beneficiary under a testamentary trust can only be given a
life interest in the property. A right to invade the principal
of the trust, and a power of appointment over the trust re-
mainder can, for all practical purposes, make the benefici-
ary's interest tantamount to an outright ownership. At the
same time, by somewhat limiting those rights, the testator
can avoid the full impact of the federal estate tax; a matter
which will be discussed later.
3. THE USES OF LIFE INSURANCE IN ESTATE PLANNING:
The ways in which life insurance may be used in the
formulation and adoption of a sound program for the ad-
ministration of an estate, are numerous. It can be used as a
50. §8638 of the Code.
51. §8633-36 of the Code.
52. §8637 of the Code.
53. If property is less than $500 in value, the Court may direct
the sum to be paid to the infant, or to some other person for the
benefit of the infant, without the appointment of a guardian. §350
of the Code, as amended in 1945, by Act No. 158, p. 234 of the 1945
Statutes.
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substitute for the testamentary trust in providing regular
income for the support and maintenance of dependents. By
use of settlement options, the insurance company is required
to invest and manage the fund, without shrinkage or the
cost of a trustee.5 Insurance can also provide funds to a
business associate or partner of the decedent, so that the
former may acquire the business or stock of the decedent.
But probably the most helpful use of insurance may be to
furnish the cash necessary for the payment of administration
expenses and taxes. If the estate assets are not liquid, insur-
ance for this purpose is not only helpful but may be abso-
lutely necessary.
Insurance for "Financial Security" for Dependents. We
shall consider first the situation where insurance is acquired
to provide financial security for the insured's dependents.
Here the use of a settlement option is necessary, or the in-
surance will merely provide a lump sum cash payment to
the beneficiary, and thus fail in its objective of providing
the beneficiary with a regular income.
Settlement options in general, provide for the retention
of the principal amount of the insurance proceeds by the
company, with the beneficiary of the policy receiving only
interest (guaranteed at a certain rate) or regular payments
comprising both principal and interest, either for the bene-
ficiary's life or for a number of years certain, or for the life
of the beneficiary and a certain number of years whichever
is longer. Most settlement options will permit the principal
to be withdrawn by the beneficiary so long as the fund is
held at interest, but will only permit a beneficiary to con-
vert (if given that right under the settlement agreement
with the policyholder) from an interest basis to a life income
basis at a stated date. Some companies with very liberal set-
tlement policies will allow the conversion at any time. The
retained fund is not required to be segregated from other
funds of the insurance company, and it has now been settled
that the company is a debtor of the beneficiary, and not a
trustee for the beneficiary's benefit.m
Since the fund is not required to be segregated from the
54. In this state a trustee's commission is by statute allowed to
be 5% of principal and 10% of income. Code §9048 and 9017. Corporate
fiduciaries, however, usually contract to receive only 5% of income.
55. See Vance on Insurance, Chapter 10, §158.
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general funds of the insurance company, it manages the
fund for the beneficiaries, without cost to them. If the com-
pany is financially strong this is an exceedingly valuable
right, but not all policy holders take advantage of it. To
anyone familiar with the problems of investments and man-
agement of trust funds, and with the likelihood of losses of
principal of the trust fund in the event of a depression, the
offer of the insurance companies to take over this respon-
sibility and burden without additional cost to the policy
holders should be accepted with alacrity. Furthermore, in-
surance companies are more able adequately to invest and
manage funds than any individual investor. For one thing,
they have personnel engaged entirely in examination of
sources for investment, they have information and means of
getting information that are not available to the ordinary
investor. For another they command, by reason of their
size, a position in the investment market which would not
be had otherwise. They are able to purchase privately at a
lower price, securities which if marketed publicly, could
only be purchased for a larger amount or producing a some-
what lower return.5 Since the insurance funds are not seg-
regated, the insurance company, not the beneficiary, bears
the risk of loss.
Settlement options have been criticized for rigitity.
57
But this criticism is not justified in the case of all companies.
Where a company is involved which has liberal policies re-
garding the making of settlement agreements, they can be
utilized for almost any purpose. Insurance companies are in
many states prohibited from exercising discretionary powers
in the administration of insurance funds which they retain
under settlement options. In many cases, though not pro-
hibited by law from the exercise of discretionary powers,
they will refuse to do so. It may therefore be desirable, or
necessary where infants are concerned, and the settlement
agreement provides for the use of the principal funds for
certain purposes, to accompany the settlement agreement
with a trust agreement or a trust declaration. Most com-
56. The advantages of an insurance company making investments
over an individual investor are summarized in an excellent little book
entitled, "Why Life Insurance?" by James Sutton Drewry (1946),
at pp. xvi et. seq.
57. Shattuck, supra, pp. 43 et. seq.
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panies will not permit settlement options to be exercised by
trustees,58 but they will pay out funds to a named trustee in
accordance with an option previously elected by the owner
of a policy.
Insurance for Administration Expenses and Taxes. Insur-
ance may be used to pay estate administration expenses and
taxes. Unless there are sufficient liquid assets in the estate,
insurance is very advisable for this purpose. However, it
may be absolutely necessary if there is no market for the
estate assets, or if the testator does not wish the estate assets
sold. The objection is sometimes made that the proceeds are
taxable in the estate and, therefore, a sufficient amount of ad-
ditional insurance must be obtained in order to pay the taxes
on the cash received from the insurance. Thus, if the estate is
in a 30% tax bracket (which is reached by a net taxable estate
of $100,000), slightly more than 30% additional insurance
would have to be obtained than the sum required ("slightly
more" because all additional insurance increases the size of the
taxable estate).59 If the decedent's spouse is his legal represen-
tative, this objection can be met by the decedent (insured)
having such a policy payable to his spouse so that the pro-
ceeds are deductible under the so-called marital deduction,
which is discussed in more detail later. Since the proceeds
will be consumed, they will not add to the estate of the
spouse, and be taxable at his or her death.
The insurance proceeds will not, of course, be included
in the insured's estate if someone else acquires the insurance
and pays the premiums themselves. If, therefore, a spouse
or an adult child for example, has separate income sufficient
to pay the premiums, they may acquire, own and pay for
insurance on the life of the decedent. The proceeds would
be available to pay the taxes and administration expenses.
However, the person who buys the insurance should make
appropriate provisions in a will or otherwise, for the policy,
58. See Trachtman, supra, "It is not possible under the optional
settlements to give someone a discretionary power to vary the scheduled
payments from time to time."
59. A bill has been introduced in Congress to exempt from estate
tax insurance proceeds ear-marked for the purpose of paying the tax
on the estate. The proposed bill has been criticized as favoring life
insurance. Its opponents say that cash or government bonds, or any
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after his death, to pass into the ownership of persons other
than the insured. Some insurance companies will provide in
the insurance contract for the succession of ownership of
the policy.
Where both husband and wife have sizeable estates,
either or both can set up funded insurance trusts, by an irre-
vocable transfer to trustees of a sufficient amount of income
producing property to purchase life insurance on the life of
the other spouse (the gift tax is, of course, payable). The
trust will be for the benefit of children or descendants of the
husband or wife; it cannot be for the benefit of the spouse
purchasing the insurance. At the death of the insured spouse
the insurance proceeds added to the original fund, can be
made available for the payment of taxes and other adminis-
tration expenses by a provision authorizing the trustees to
purchase assets of the estate, whether or not legal invest-
ments, or to lend money to the estate on the security of the
estate's assets. Such a provision is not sufficient, under pres-
ent law, to make the decedent's estate a beneficiary of the
trust, consequently the doctrine of reciprocity heretofore
discussed is not applicable. The proceeds are not taxakle in
the estate of the decedent since he neither paid the prem-
iums nor owned the policy. Moreover, there is not here the
problem of the policy succession if the spouse who created
the trust dies before the insured. The insurance is an asset
of the trust, not of the spouse creating the trust.
From an income tax viewpoint such an arrangement is
desirable. Since the trust income is used to pay premiums of
insurance on the life of a person other than the grantor, the
trust income is not, under present law, taxable to the grantor
under Sec. 167 (a) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code. 0 The
60. Commissioner v. Jergens, 127 Fed. (2d) 973 (CCA 5, 1942);
Lucy A. Blumenthal, 30 BTA 591; Baldwin, 36 BTA 364; Bloomingdale,
3 TCM 1163. However, if the grantor is directly or indirectly the bene-
ficiary of the life insurance policy the trust income used to pay the
premiums is taxable to her, Commissioner v. Wilson, 132 Fed. (2d)
255 (CCA 6, 1942). There can be no possibility of a reversion to the
grantor, nor can it be possible for her to obtain any benefit from the
trust, Commissioner v. Van Dusan, 138 Fed. (2d) 510 (CCA 6, 1943).
It is advisable for the trust to take out the insurance policies rather
than for the spouse to assign them to the trust, Commissioner v. Morton,
108 Fed. (2d) 1005 (CCA 7, 1940); Phipps v. Helvering, 124 Fed.
(2d) 288 (CA of DC, 1941).
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trust is a separate taxable entity and its income tax rate will
be much lower than that of the individual grantor, thus sub-
stantial income tax savings on the income used for insurance
premiums are realized.
A somewhat similar plan is for a grandparent to create a
funded insurance trust for the benefit of his grandchild, to
acquire and own insurance on the life of the child's parent.
The trust property, including the insurance proceeds, could,
by appropriate provisions in the trust instrument as men-
tioned above, be made available for the cash requirements of
the parent's estate. Where this plan is feasible, it has several
attractive features. First, the trust property, including the in-
surance proceeds, is not taxed in the estate of the grand-
parent or the parent. Second, the income from the trust is not
taxed to the grandparent. The insurance is not on the life of
the grantor, and therefore the trust is a separate taxable
entity. Thus, if $20,000 is set up in trust and the income there-
from is $800 per annum, the trust income tax will be ap-
proximately $100, whereas the tax to the grandparent, if the
latter is in a 50% tax bracket, would be $400. Third, if the
purpose of the trust is to save income taxes, and the corporea
is available for the education of the grandchild, or to set the
grandchild up in business, or to enable the grandchild to
get married, etc., there is less danger of the gift being "in
contemplation of death" than if the gift were outright. Such
a trust could also be created by the will of the grandparent,
with substantial income and estate tax advantages. 61 In
some states a legal problem concerning improper accumula-
tions of surplus in violation of the rule against perpetuities
would arise where the income from the trust is used to pay
insurance premiums beyond the child's minority, but this
problem would not arise in South Carolina.
Insurance to Fund a Buy and Sell Agreement. Life insur-
ance may also be used to finance an inter vivos agreement
with a business associate or partner, obligating the latter
to purchase the business interest of the decedent at death.
Such an agreement permits the value of the decedent's busi-
ness interest to be fully realized by his estate. It may also
dispense with the very difficult and troublesome question
of the valuation for tax purposes of that business interest.
61. See Mannheimer & Wheeler, Trusts of Insurance on Relative's
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It will not avail the decedent taxwise to have insurance
taken out by a corporation wholly owned by him. Under the
regulations of the Treasury Department the corporation is
considered his alter ego and the proceeds are includible tax-
wise in his gross estate.62 Furthermore, unless there is some
basic reason for the corporation owning the insurance, the
Bureau of Internal Revenue might contend that the prem-
iums should be subjected to income tax by the individual as
a distribution of profits from the corporation. Where the
beneficiary of the insurance is the wife or children of the
insured rather than the corporation,68 the premiums will al-
ways be taxed to the individual-whether the premiums will
be treated as additional compensation or as a distribution of
profits depends on the facts. If, however, where the cor-
poration is the beneficiary and its purchase of the insurance
can be justified as a proper business move, such as, an eco-
nomic compensation for the loss of the personal services and
good-will contributions of the insured, it would seem that
it would be immaterial whether the proceeds are includible
in the estate or are reflected in the value of the stock of the
corporation.
II
4. REDucTIoN OF ADMINISTRATION EXPENSES:
Most lawyers have heard the anecdote about the young
son, just out of law school, who closed up an old estate while
the father was taking his first vacation in years. When the
father returned and his son proudly announced what he had
done, the father sadly said: "Son, that estate brought you
62. Reg. 105, §81.27.
63. Bonwit v. Commissioner, 87 Fed. (2d) 764, (CCA 2, 1937), cert.
den'd. 302 U. S. 694. The theory upon which insurance proceeds pay-
able to a corporation which decedent owns or controls, is taxable in the
decedent's estate, is that the premiums were paid indirectly by the
decedent. Logically it would seem that since the decedent is charged
with having paid the premiums he would, for income tax purposes, be
charged with the receipt of the money with which they were paid. A
somewhat similar situation is where a corporation permits a stock-
holder to occupy, rent free, premises owned by the corporation. This
results in the reasonable rental value of the property being charged to
the stockholder as additional compensation or as a corporate distribution.
(Chandler v. Commissioner, 119 Fed. (2d) 623).
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into the world and gave you your education-I had counted
on it to support me in my old age."
The story is a modern version of an age-old layman
criticism of lawyers-that legal matters are unnecessarily
drawn out. Of 'course if a lawyer should keep an estate
open only so that he may draw out fees, he should be suspended
or disbarred from practice. A competent lawyer, however,
is usually indispensable in the administration of an estate;
although he may do most of the work of administration, his
fee is commonly less than the commission of an executor. If
a testator is concerned with the prospective fee of his estate
lawyer or with the commissions of his executor, he should
be very much interested in the steps he can take now to re-
duce the expenses which will be incurred in the ultimate
administration. of his estate. Some of the ways in which this
may be done are discussed.
Clarity and Sufficiency of Instrument. A will or trust must
be in writing.# However, if the document is too brief or am-
biguously worded, it may require judicial proceedings for in-
terpretation at many stages of its administration. Indeed it
is probably more economical, in the case of a will, if the State
Statutory plan of descent and distribution is satisfactory, to
have no will at all rather than an ambiguous or insufficient
one. Judicial proceedings for interpretation and instructions
are expensive and all expenses are payable out of the estate
or fund. 5 No one will dispute the fact that brevity is more
often than not a virtue, but its charm may not be appreciated
in a will or in an inter vivos trust. Testators or creators of
trusts had probably rather save dollars than words. Profes-
sor W. Barton Leach of the Harvard Law School has said:
64. See §8916 and 9041 of the 1942 Code of South Carolina.
65. The classical fictional example of the extent to which prolonged
administration of an estate or trust, can support and educate the fami-
lies of lawyers, trustees, guardians and judicial hangers-on, is Jarndyce
v. Jarndyce, in "Bleak House", by Dickens. Many modern cases reflect
a record of estate or trust administration that was undoubtedly very
expensive, see e.g. Scovill v. Scovill, 191 S. C. 323, 4 S. E. (2d) 286;
Lemmon v. Wilson, 205 S. C. 297, 31 S. E. (2d) 745; Wingard v.
Hennessee, 206 S. C. 159, 33 S. E. (2d) 390; Snelling v. McCreary,
14 Rich Eq. 291; Boggs v. Ried, 3 Rich. 450. Where the event on
which instructions are requested may or may not occur, the Court will
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"Nobody doubts the proposition that a thought is best
expressed in the fewest words. But it is too often true
that conciseness of expression is a cloak for incom-
pleteness of thought."6
Probably the most frequent occasions for seeking ju-
dicial interpretations of wills or trusts deeds occur when the
beneficiaries are named as a class. A common instance is
when there is a bequest to, or trust for children. Questions
may arise as to whether the word "children" includes grand-
children,67 illegitimate children,6s or adopted children. 9 If a
bequest of a remainder interest is made conditional on sur-
vivorship, the question arises as to whom the beneficiary
must survive in order to be eligible for the bequest. Is it the
testator or is it the life beneficiary? Proceedings for inter-
pretation are often necessary in connection with a provision
for distribution to remaindermen in accordance with the
laws of descent and distribution of the state of residence.
Did the testator mean that the distribution should be in ac-
cordance with the law in effect at the time of his death or
in effect at the time of the ultimate distribution?
The rule against perpetuities must always be watched
when a gift is not outright. If the rule applies and is violated
in any respect, plans for ultimate distribution may not be ful-
filled. While it is not intended here to discuss the rule, it may
be pointed out that the most frequent inadvertent violations
of the rule occur in giving remainders to persons who may
not be in existence at the time of the death of the testator or
at the time of the creation of an inter vivos trust, such as a
future spouse or child of the beneficiary7 0
Powers of Fiduciaries. The failure to give sufficient powers
to the executor or a testamentary trustee may cause consider-
66. 24 American Bar Association Journal, p. 807 (October, 1938).
67. Probably it does not, Logan v. Brunson, 56 S. C. 7, 33 S. H. 737,
but other provisions in the will or trust deed may indicate that it was
so intended. See Green v. Green, 210 S. C. 391, 42 S. E. (2d) 884.
.68. Probably not. See Wish v. Kershaw, Bailey's Equity 352, note.
69. The question apparently has not been decided in this state. At
common law an adopted child would inherit from its immediate adopting
parents but not from others through the adopting parents. See Wheeling
Dollar Savings and Trust Co. v. Stewart, 37 S. E. (2d) 563, West Vir-
ginia (1946).
70. For an excellent and comprehensive discussion of this question
see Perpetuities in a Nut Shell, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 638 (1938).
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able expense to the estate. As has been mentioned before,
the executor, by law, is given no power other than what is
necessary to collect, liquidate and distribute the estate; and
he has no power to sell assets of the estate without court
approval.71
Probably the power to compromise claims is less essen-
tial than a power of sale, but if the fiduciary does not have
this power, it may be embarrassing to the fiduciary and it
may also be costly in the administration of an estate. Of
course, if the claim is against the estate, the fiduciary is au-
thorized, nay, it is his duty to pay as little as he can. But if
the claim is by the estate, the fiduciary has no authority to
compromise it for less than its face amount. No doubt there
have been instances where the claim was entirely lost be-
cause of the lack of authority in the fiduciary to accept less
than its par value. The theory is that a fiduciary has no
authority to give away assets of the estate, and by compro-
mising a claim he is, in effect, giving away estate property
to the extent that he accepts as payment in full the payment
of less than the full amount due. The proof which a court
will naturally require for approving settlement of a claim
at less than par involves evidence of the financial worth of
the debtor. Such evidence might be difficult to obtain and
time consuming in its preparation and presentation. This
authority therefore might be essential.
Obviously any executor or trustee who contemplates any
action where his power is doubtful, will first seek judicial
instructions. The request for instructions are involved and
all interested parties must be joined in the proceedings and
brought before the court.
Such proceedings may be eliminated by giving adequate
powers to the fiduciaries in the first place. In addition to
giving them the power to sell both real and personal prop-
erty in the estate and to compromise claims of the estate, it
is desirable also to provide that they (either only those
named in the will or trust deed or anyone serving) shall
have the authority to lend money, either on security or
otherwise; to make leases for any term; to retain the in-
vestments of the testator; to vote stock; give proxies there-
for; to join in reorganizations; to rescind or vary the terms
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of contracts and claims; to carry the legal title to property
in the name of a nominee; to provide for depreciation of de-
preciable property, and, if necessary, to carry a reserve there-
for; to make distributions in kind; to make distribution of
funds to infants in the discretion of the fiduciaries; to employ
legal and clerical assistance, if needed, and, in the case of
trustees, to resign without judicial authorization. The fidu-
ciary should also be given the authority, under certain cir-
cumstances, to borrow money, a power which, as a matter
of law, he would not have. In the absence of authority there-
for, a Court will be reluctant to grant the authority unless
the need is clearly shown, and the proving of such need in
the form of judicial evidence might be difficult. It would
seem therefore desirable to authorize a fiduciary to borrow
money if, in his judgment, the borrowing is desirable or
necessary in order to prevent the loss of or increase the es-
tate assets.
If the trustees are not, by the will or trust instrument,
given a broader authority to make investments, they are
limited to those specified in the Code as legal for trustees
and other fiduciaries 2 Certainly if the fiduciary is not ex-
perienced in this respect, such a limitation is desirable. On
the other hand, if the fiduciary is a corporate one, or if an
individual is qualified by knowledge and experience to
make investments, the limitations are probably not desir-
able. This matter is discussed in more detail in another
section of this paper.
Guardians. A third item which may entail unnecessary ex-
pense in the administration of an estate is judicial proceed-
ings for the appointment of a guardian for infants. In this
state such proceedings may be avoided by naming a guardian
in a will or by including a so-called "minority clause", which
directs an executor or trustee to accumulate funds for an
infant except for that portion which is needed for his welfare
and support. On the other hand, when an infant is a party to
a litigation he can only appear by a guardian ad litem. The
general guardian or parent of the infant is not automatically
the guardian ad litem, but the latter is specially appointed to
that office.7 3 Thus, if any proceedings are brought for the in-
terpretation of the will or trust, or for fiduciaries to be au-
72. §9051 of the 1942 Code, as amended by the Acts of 1947 and 1948.
73. §401 and 402 of the 1942 Code.
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thorized to take appropriate action, if any of the beneficiaries
are infants, guardians ad litem will have to be appointed for
them.
Reducing Size of the Estate to be Administered. Since al-
most all expenses of administration, including court costs, the
estate attorney's fee and the executor's commission, are di-
rectly related to the size of the probate estate, such expenses
can be reduced by inter vivos arrangements tending to reduce
the size of that estate. The "probate estate" is a different
thing from the "taxable estate". The probate estate in-
cludes, generally speaking, only the property of the de-
cedent at the time of his death. It is this estate which is ad-
ministered and it is also this estate which is looked at when
computing the South Carolina inheritance and estate taxes.
On the other hand, the federal estate tax is assessed on the
"taxable estate" which includes property items specified in
the Internal Revenue Code which are not a part of the pro-
bate estate. Thus the taxable estate, in addition to the pro-
bate estate, includes (a) all of the insurance on his own life
owned by the decedent (it makes no difference to whom it
is payable) ; (b) gifts by an incomplete trust ("incomplete"
for tax purposes) and (c) gifts that are in contemplation
of death. 74
The usual way of reducing the size of the probate estate
is to give property away in the form of a revocable trust-
retaining the income therefrom, or the right to designate
the persons to whom the income should be paid. Such trusts
are not recognized for either federal estate or gift taxes, or
for federal income taxes, but they are not a part of an
estate for purposes of administration, nor for state inherit-
ance tax in South Carolina. 5 Since they are not recognized
for federal tax purposes, there is no problem of making
them comply with the requirements for a complete gift or
of the gift being "in contemplation of death".
74. §2480 (c) of the South Carolina Code provides that there shall
be included in an estate, for the purpose of the state inheritance tax,
any gift to a relative by blood or marriage made within five years of
death, as such gifts shall be presumed to have been in contemplation
of death.
75. See Simmons v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 134 S. C. 261,
132 S. E. 37 and Barkley v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 191 S. C.
147, 3 S. E. (2d) 809 (1939).
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5. THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX-ITS MINIMIZATION :76
Normally it is a fairly simple accounting problem to
compute the estate taxes. Not so simple however, is the ar-
ranging of an advance program for their minimization. A
full and complete discussion of this problem would un-
doubtedly require several volumes,77 but here it must be
compressed within the confines of a single article. Accord-
ingly many important subjects, such as gifts in contempla-
tion of death and that of the "basis" of property owned by
a taxpayer, can only be summarized not developed.
Naturally no one, in his right mind, wishes to pay more
taxes than he has to. Unfortunately the Bureau has adopted
the policy of assessing the maximum tax possible in a par-
ticular transaction, regardless of the taxpayer's actual in-
tention. Because of this and also because many lawyers
have evolved schemes solely for tax avoidance, the amount
of estate tax in a particular case may depend on whether
the testator's tax lawyer was more or less astute than the
Bureau attorneys. Federal taxes have now become an un-
believably important item in family budgets. The income
tax rate rises to over 90% of the taxpayer's annual income
76. The discussion is limited to the federal estate tax, and does not
include references to the state tax, except in certain important particu-
lars. The state tax is relatively unimportant. Its inheritance tax rates are
from 1% to 14%. In addition there is a state estate tax imposed up to the
80% credit of the federal basic tax, discussed below. The federal
estate tax consists of two separate taxes, one called the basic tax
and one called the additional tax. The basic tax is applicable only to
estates of $100,000 and over and an 80% credit against this tax is
allowed for any state inheritance or estate taxes payable. Prior to the
marital deduction, this credit would normally be sufficient to take
care of South Carolina inheritance tax, where the estate was larger
than $100,000. Now, however, if the marital deduction is taken in full,
the credit would not be sufficient for the state inheritance taxes unless
the estate was substantially greater than $200,000. The additional tax
($60,000 exemption) is the important one.
77. Paul's Federal Estate and Gift Taxation is the standard work
in the federal estate and gift tax field. It comprises two volumes of
some 1600 pages, with a 1946 supplement of over 900 additional pages.
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and the estate tax rate to 77 Y.78 Last year Congress recog-
nized that these taxes were in reality a family, rather than
an individual, burden and enacted amendments to the Code
which authorized the total income of a married couple to be
split between them, thereby permitting the total tax to be
computed by the application to their joint income of the
rate attributable to only one-half thereof. In the estate tax
field, the amendment introduced a marital preferment
which permits bequests by will or inheritance to a surviving
spouse to be deducted from the total taxable estate, up to
50% of the total "adjusted gross estate".7 9 The amendment
to the gift tax law permits one-half of a gift to a spouse to
be deducted from the taxable gift, and permits gifts to third
persons to be split between the spouses.
In order to take advantage of the marital deduction, it is
necessary that the bequest or devise, or the gift, conform with
certain technical requirements so that it will qualify for de-
duction from the estate or the gift. The requirements for
qualification for deduction from the estate are discussed in
the next section, but the requirements for qualification in the
case of the gift tax are discussed later under inter vivas gifts.
78. The tables below give some round figure illustrations of the ap-
plication of the tax in 1931 and today.
FEDERAL INCOME TAX
Taxable Income 1931 Tax Present Tax (assuming
separate return)





Taxable Estate 1931 Tax Present Tax (assuming
no marital deduction)




79. §812 (e) of the Internal Revenue Code. The term "adjusted
gross estate", a new one in the estate tax law, is defined to be the
gross estate less the deductible expenses specified in §812 (b). The
marital deduction percentage while generally spoken of as 50% of
the adjusted gross estate is not that, since it can only be computed
after the estate taxes on the remainder of the estate has been taken
into account. (I. R. C., §812 (e) (1) (E) (i).
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(a) The Marital Deduction in the Estate Tax:
To qualify for the martial deduction the bequest or de-
vise to the surviving spouse must be so absolute that there
can be no question but that the property, if unconsumed,
will be taxable in the spouse's estate upon the latter's
death.80 A property interest which will terminate upon the
spouse's death or earlier, will not qualify for the marital
deduction if a continuing interest in the same property is a
gift or bequest from the testator to someone other than the
spouse.8' A bequest or devise to a spouse, which will be en-
tirely consumed during her lifetime qualifies. But by spe-
cific exception, where the testator's executor or trustee is
directed to purchase such an interest (for example an an-
nuity) for a surviving spouse it does not qualify.82 This spe-
cific exception produces the odd result that if a testator
leaves his widow an annuity, it qualifies for the marital de-
duction, but if he directs his executor to use estate funds to
purchase an annuity for his widow, it does not qualify.
The bequest or devise to the surviving spouse must be
to her alone. In other words, it cannot be left in a joint ten-
ancy with survivorship rights, nor can anyone else be given
the right to share in the income therefrom. If, therefore, a
testator desires to create a trust for his widow and children,
a single trust cannot qualify for the marital deduction; sepa-
rate trusts must be created for them. A bequest or devise,
however, may be absolutely to a spouse even though the
interest left to her is an undivided one. That is to say, a sur-
viving spouse may receive by bequest or devise an tindivided
interest in real or personal property, but since the spouse
80. We can assume that there will be much litigation and probably
helpful judicial interpretations on the question of when such a transfer
is sufficiently absolute for the marital deduction. Heretofore, litigation
has often occurred on the contention by the taxpayer, that a gift by
testamentary trust with a surviving spouse having the right, under
certain circumstances, to use the corpus, was a "terminable" interest, so
as to save the "second" tax. Under the marital deduction, if the gift is
not a terminable interest the "first" tax will be avoided. Therefore,
it is reasonable to assume that "adroit legal minds" will be devoted to
trying to prove that such a trust is not a terminable interest rather
than, as before, trying to prove that it was a terminable interest.
81. I. R. C., §812 (e) (1) (B) (i) (ii) and Reg. 105, §81.47a and
81.47b (d).
82. I. R. C., §812 (e) (1) (B) (iii) and Reg. 105, §81.47b (e).
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has, in South Carolina, a right of partition the bequest or
devise qualifies for the marital deduction.
If the devise or bequest is in the form of a testamentary
trust and the spouse is given the power to consume the entire
fund or is given a power of appointment of the entire fund
running to her estate, the bequest qualifies for the marital
deduction; but if the right to consume or to appoint is of d
portion only, no marital deduction whatever is allowed.8 The
fact that contingent takers of the remainder are named, or
that other persons are named to take upon failure of the
spouse to appoint to her estate, makes no difference.8 4
Many testators will certainly wish to establish testamen-
tary trust for their surviving spouses, with their children
named as the ultimate beneficiaries. In order to qualify such
trusts for the marital deduction, they will naturally provide
that the spouse shall have a general power of appointment
over the property, including the power to appoint the prop-
erty to her estate. But in South Carolina a general residuary
legacy includes any property over which the testator had
been given a general power of appointment.8 In this state
therefore, it may be desirable to limit the spouse's power of
appointment to her own estate. This is quite sufficient to
qualify for the deduction.
The marital deduction, where it is taken advantage of,
will always reduce the estate tax in the case of the first
spouse to die. It may not however, result in the over-all
83. Reg. 105, §81.47a (c). It is interesting to consider the hiatus,
or no-man's land, of transfers to a spouse that will not qualify for the
marital deduction, but at the same time are sufficiently absolute to
make the property taxable in the surviving spouse's estate. This hiatus
should certainly be avoided.
84. I. R. C., §812 (e) (1) (F) and (G) and Reg. 105, §81.47a (c).
See also discussion of §812 (e) (1) (D) (E) (F) and (G) in the
report of the Senate Finance Committee on the changes made by the
Revenue Act of 1948.
85. In the case of Thomson v. Ehrlich, 148 S. C. 330, 146 S. E.
149 (1928) it was held that a residuary devise did not include real
property over which the testatrix had a general power of appointment.
Thereafter the Code was amended by the addition of §8928 to provide
that a residuary bequest or devise should include real and personal
property over which the testator has a power of appointment. This
section does not apply if the power of appointment must be exercised
specifically, nor does it apply if the residuary clause of the will in-
dicates that it is not intended to cover the appointive property.
37
Bruton: Estate Planning
Published by Scholar Commons, 1949
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
reduction of estate taxes. Unless the property is consumed
by the surviving spouse, it will be taxed in that spouse's es-
tate and if the surviving spouse has as large or a larger
estate than the deceased spouse, the tax will be as great or
greater. The use during the remainder of the surviving
spouse's lifetime of the money which otherwise would be
used to pay the tax, may or may not be compensatory. As
the amendments to the Code which introduced the marital
deduction also repealed the section providing for a credit
for property previously taxed, in the case of a spouse, a
bequest to or inheritance by a surviving spouse of an entire
estate, might cause the over-all taxes to be greater than they
would have been prior to the amendment.
Whether or not and the extent to which the marital de-
duction should be used presents questions which should be
given serious consideration. The marital deduction, of
course, as has been pointed out earlier, may be used in the
form of a testamentary trust. But wherever the marital de-
duction is not used, a testamentary trust presents major tax
advantages.
(b) The Testamentary Trust:
The primary estate tax saving factor in the testamentary
trust is its saving of the "second tax". That is to say, in all
situations there will be an estate tax on the taxable estate
of the testator at his death, and in the case of an outright
bequest to a beneficiary there will also be an estate tax upon
the inherited property on the death of the beneficiary. sG
If the beneficiary is not the spouse, and dies within five years
of the testator, the Code permits a deduction of the property
previously taxed.87 Where, however, the beneficiary does not
receive the property outright, but only receives the use of
the property, or its income, for his or her lifetime, by use
of the testamentary trust, the property is not included in
the estate of 'the beneficiary at the beneficiary's death, re-
86. In addition to the "second tax" there could also be a "third" or
more estate tax on the same property, all of which, except one, can
be avoided by the use of the'testamentary trust, but only one of which
can be avoided by the marital deduction.
87. I. R. C., §812 (d), Reg. 105, §81.41. See Paul, Federal Estate
and Gift Taxation, §11.29 and 11.30. In South Carolina a "second tax"
is payable if the beneficiary dies after one year from the date of the
death of the first decedent. 1948 Supplement to the 1942 Code, §2491.
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gardless of when that occurs.
If a testamentary trust qualifies for the marital deduc-
tion, even though it is not effective taxwise (since it might
be in excess of the 50% limitation) the "second tax" cannot
be avoided, nor can there be a deduction for property pre-
viously taxed. On the other hand, if the beneficiary of the
trust is not a spouse, or if it is not intended as a marital de-
duction trust, the testamentary trust is very definitely the
only way in which the "second tax" can be saved. The other
important tax considerations in the testamentary trust are
the power to consume principal and the power to appoint
the remainder interest.
(1) Power to Consume Principal
If the life beneficiary of a testamentary trust has the
right to appropriate or consume all or any part of the principal
trust fund, this right makes the portion of the trust princi-
pal, which can be obtained or used, although unconsumed
in fact, taxable in the estate of the beneficiary.8 Treasury
Regulation 105, Sec. 81.24 (b) (1) specifically says:
"For example, if a settlor transfers property in trust
for the life of his wife, with a power in the wife to ap-
propriate or consume the principal of the trust, the wife
has a (taxable) power of appointment."
Where the right to obtain or consume the principal of
the trust is subject to a limitation, the result from the estate
tax viewpoint depends entirely on the nature of the limita-
tion. If it is purely as to the amount of invasion permitted,
such as a limited sum annually, the portion of the corpus
includible in the estate of the beneficiary will be the annual
amount of invasion of principal permitted, multiplied by
the life expectancy of the beneficiary. If the amount of the
invasion of principal permitted depends on the income
earned by the trust fund, the earnings will be estimated and
the deficiency multiplied by the life expectancy of the bene-
ficiary.89 Where the right of the beneficiary to invade prin-
88. I. R. C., §811 (f). Prior to the 1942 amendments to the Code, a
power in the beneficiary to consume the principal of the trust did not
cause the unconsumed principal to be taxed in the beneficiary's estate.
Estate of Gertrude L. Royce, 46 BTA. 1090 (1942). The Commissioner
formally acquiesced in this holding (1942-2 Cum. Bull. 16).
89. Banker's Trust Co. v. Higgins, 158 Fed. (2d) 957 (CCA 2, 1947).
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cipal depends on the occurrence of some outside event, such
as sickness, the question is more or less in an unsettled state.
If the beneficiary is permitted to decide whether or not the
occurrence permitting an invasion is applicable, or if the
invasion is permitted upon a sufficiently definite "external
standard" so that the beneficiary can enforce legally her
right of invasion, the corpus is probably includible, but not
otherwise.9
If the right to invade the principal of a testamentary trust
is given to an independent trustee, and he is authorized to
make the invasion for the beneficiary only in "his untram-
meled discretion", the corpus is not included in the bene-
ficiary's estate. 91 Moreover, the power in the trustee is specif-
ically a non-taxable power.92 A distinction must be recognized
between authorizing and directing an independent trustee to
invade principal for a beneficiary upon the happening of cer-
tain enumerated events. That is to say, where an independent
trustee is authorized to invade principal for the beneficiary
only in certain events, the corpus is clearly not taxable in the
beneficiary's estate. The trustee has "untrammeled discre-
tion" only upon the occurrence of any of the enumerated
events. On the other hand, where a trustee, even though
independent, is directed to invade the principal fund for the
beneficiary upon the happening of certain enumerated
events, and the right of the beneficiary to the principal in
such events is absolute, the question of taxability depends
on the probability of any of the enumerated events happen-
90. Estate of Virginia H. West, 9 T.C. 736 (October 22, 1947).
Where the trust is a testamentary one, naturally no question could
arise as to whether the "external standard" is sufficiently definite so
that the grantor, as a trustee, could be said to have no retained power.
Logically a sufficiently definite "external standard" to avoid the inclusion
of an inter vivos trust in a grantor-trustee's estate should be precisely
the same as that which will make the testamentary trust taxable in
the beneficiary's estate. See Estate of John J. Toeller, 6 T.C. 832;
Estate of Milton J. Budlong, 7 T.C. 756; Jennings v. Smith, 161 Fed.
(2d) 74.
91. The distinction between invasion in the discretion of a trustee and
invasion by a beneficiary was clearly brought out in Commissioner
v. Dravo, 119 F. (2d) 97 (CCA 3, 1941). See also Estate of Walter E.
Frew, 8 T.C. 1240 (June 24, 1947); Jennings v. Smith, 161 Fed. (2d)
74; Estate of J. M. Budlong, 7 T.C. 756; Estate of John A. Lucey,
6 T.C.M ...- (October 28, 1947).
92. I. R. C., §811 (f); see also Reg. 105, §81.2.
40
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 2 [1949], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol2/iss2/4
ESTATE PLANNING
ing. If the occurrence upon which the trustee is directed to
invade principal for the beneficiary is unlikely to occur, the
principal will probably not be included in the beneficiary's
estate. On the other hand, if the enumerated events are so
broad and general that it would be extremely difficult to
say that they will or will not occur, the principal is likely to
be included. Thus, if the trustee is directed to invade princi-
pal for the "comfort", "happiness" or "welfare" of the
beneficiary, the power to invade for the beneficiary is so
broad and general that it may not be in the trustee's "un-
trammeled discretion" and it is quite likely that the entire
corpus would be included in the estate of the beneficiary.9
These views have also been controlling in determining
whether or not a charitable deduction is allowable where
the charitable remainder is after a life income with invasion
permitted in the discretion of trustees.9
If the life beneficiary of an inter vivos trust is given the
right to invade the principal, or if trustees are directed to in-
vade the principal for the benefit of the life beneficiary, the
results may be somewhat different. This subject is discussed
under the inter vivos gift in trust.
(2) Powers of Appointment
The usual understanding of a power of appointment is
where the life beneficiary of a trust has the power to name
or appoint the remaindermen. This power over trust princi-
pal is an extremely useful arrangement, and is best used to
avoid the inflexibility which otherwise would invariably re-
sult from a gift to take effect in the future. Its use enables
the owner of property to defer its ultimate division among
the "objects of his bounty", until consideration can be had
of factors which he could not possibly have foreseen at the
time he made his will, or created the trust, such as the needs
of his descendants at the time of the death of his child or
grandchild, etc.9 In view of the social and the economic
93. See Estate of Mary E. Wenger, 42 BTA. 225.
94. Ithaca Trust Co. v. U. S. 279 U. S. 151; Merchant's National
Bank v. Commissioner, 320 U. S. 256; Henslee v. Union Planter's
National Bank and Trust Co., 335 U. S. 239 (January 3, 1949); see
also Estate of Winfred Runyan, 5 TCM 531 (June 28, 1946); Estate
of L. H. Elmer, 6 TC 944; Estate of Arthur M. Briggs, 5 TCM 1114
(December 26, 1946).
95. See Paul, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation, Chapter 9.
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desirability of the use'of powers of appointment, and hav-
ing in mind that the object of the estate tax is to tax prop-
erty transfers occurring by reason of the owner's death,
the conclusion is inevitable that the power in a donee of a
power to transfer the property to "strangers" should be
taxed, but that the power only to allocate or distribute the
property among the objects of the donor's bounty, in ac-
cordance with their needs, or with what it is thought the
donor would have wished, should not be taxed. The Statute
attempts to follow this distinguishing line, and we find that
a power to appoint property to ones own estate (which is
equivalent to ownership) and to "strangers", that is, to
persons other than the donor's spouse, and descendants or
the donee's spouse and descendants, makes the power tax-
able.96 Also a person who is a "stranger" and has had no
beneficial enjoyment of the property, but who has the
limited and discretionary power to name the beneficiaries
among a restricted class, is not taxed for having that re-
sponsibility. Thus, a friend is given the right to decide which
children of the testator takes certain property; this is not a
taxable power; or an independent trustee is given the right
to say which of the descendants of the testator has the
greatest need, and this is not taxable.
A customary form of testamentary trust with a non-tax-
able limited power of appointment would be a trust created
by the will of a testator providing that his child should
receive the income therefrom for his life and at the child's
death the principal of the trust should be distributed to
any or all of the children of the income beneficiary in ac-
cordance with directions in a will or deed of the income
beneficiary. The testator, if he so desired, could indicate
what considerations should influence the directions for ulti.
mate distribution among his grandchildren.97
96. I. R. C., §811 (f) and Reg. 105, §81.24.
97. Before October 21, 1942 (the effective date of the amendments
reflecting the present law) many persons had been given powers of
appointment, which were not then taxable but which were made taxable
by the 1942 amendments. Congress accordingly provided that any power
given prior to the effective date of the amendments can be renounced
free of gift tax in whole or part at any time prior to July 1, 1950.
This date may or may not be further extended. If it is not, any re-
nunciation of powers subsequent to that date will probably be taxable
as a gift to the persons taking in default of the exercise of the power.
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In South Carolina the tax is an inheritance tax and not
an estate tax. The Code9s provides that the transfer of prop-
erty, either by the exercise of a power of appointment or
by default in its exercise (by the death of the donee of
the power without its exercise, or by the expiration of the
time for its exercise), shall be taxable under the inherit-
ance tax provisions. While the Code is silent on the subject,
since the tax is on inheritance, it would seem that property
devised or bequeathed under a power of appointment would
not be taxable in the estate of the donor of the power since
it would not be known, at the donor's death, who the ulti-
mate beneficiaries would be.
(3) Conclusion as to a Testamentary Trust
A testamentary trust for a spouse will not result in the
reduction of over-all estate taxes as before the Revenue Act
of 1948, unless a testator wishes to take advantage of the
marital deduction by leaving other property to his spouse.
However, the testamentary trust device may, for a surviving
spouse, be used so as to qualify it for the marital deduction
and still retain its many non-tax advantages. The Code per-
mits a trust to qualify if the spouse may consume the prin-
cipal or has an unlimited power to appoint the remainder
to her own estate, but regardless of this it continues as a
very beneficial means of providing income and, in a trustee's
discretion, principal to a widow and children without busi-
ness experiences.
On the other hand, a testamentary trust for children or
other objects of a testator's bounty, and even for non-marital
deduction property left to a surviving spouse, is highly ad-
vantageous taxwise. It is the only effective legitimate device
for avoiding subsequent estate taxes on the same property
in the beneficiary's estate. In those instances where a sur-
viving spouse has a substantial separate estate, it may be
unwise to take advantage of the marital deduction, especial-
ly where the age of the spouse is such that no substantial
advantage can be anticipated from the use of the money
resulting from the tax savings in the estate of the first
spouse to die. In such case a testamentary trust is clearly
indicated.
98. §2480 (d) (S. C. Code of 1942).
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(c) Inter Vivos Gifts:
The testamentary trust is established by will and is effec-
tive only upon the death of the testator. The inter vivos gift,
on the other hand, is made during the lifetime of the donor.
It not only is a useful device in reducing estate taxes, but
is effective also for the reduction of income taxes (where
the gift is not to a spouse). As it is made during the life-
time of the donor, it presents several tax problems which
do not arise from the use of the testamentary trust. If the
gift is found to be in "contemplation of death", it is inef-
fective from an estate tax viewpoint; if it is in trust, the
trust must be complete, that is, the donor must not have
retained income or the right to name beneficiaries; and
there must be no condition that the beneficiary survive the
grantor. As the Code imposes a separate tax on gifts, there
must be a consideration of the gift tax liability. The tax basis
of property given away also differs materially from the tax
basis of inherited property; this also must be considered.
However, where a gift is sufficient, and is advisable, the
advantages are real. There may be material savings in the
income tax and the gift tax rates are substantially lower
than the estate tax rates.99 Here the marital deduction
should always be used and is of great importance. The $30,-
000 exemption, as well as the annual exclusion of $3,000 to
each donee of a gift of a present interest 00 is doubled by
99. The -gift tax rates are uniformly three-fourths of the estate tax
rates.
100. In using the words "present interest" and "future interest", Con-
gress apparently did not have in mind that these are words of art in
conveyancer's language. What is meant, is whether or not the bene-
ficiary has an immediate use and enjoyment of the gift. An outright gift
to an adult presents no question. Neither does a gift in trust to an
adult where the beneficiary is entitled to the income, even though he is
not the remainderman. However, gifts in trust for children are more
likely than not to be held to be gifts of future interest. This would
certainly be the case where the trustee is directed to accumulate the
income until the child's majority. In Fondren v. Commissioner, 324
U. S. 18, it was held that a trust where the income was to be paid
out only as the trustees believed it was necessary for the support,
education or maintenance of the children was a gift of a future in-
terest. The Court held that the children did not have an unqualified
right to the enjoyment of the gift at the present. This whole question
is discussed at length in an article in the October 1948 issue of
"Taxes", (Anderson, Gifts to Children and Incompetents, 26 Taxes, 911).
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reason of the marital deduction.101 A gift moreover, re-
moves the property given away from the top bracket of the
estate tax to the low bracket of the gift tax. Thus, a net gift
of $10,000 (that is, after the exemption and exclusion)
would be subjected to a gift tax of 214% on the first $5,000
and 51/4% on the next $5,000, or a total of $375; but if the
donor has a taxable estate of $100,000, the gift would have
been subjected to a 30% estate tax or $3,000. By making a
gift of income producing property, income taxes may also
be saved. For example, in the illustration used; suppose the
property valued at $10,000 produces $1,000 annual in-
come. If the donor is in a 50% tax bracket, he received only
$500. spendable income. If, on the other hand, the donee is
in a 20% income tax bracket, $800 spendable income is
retained 2
(1) The Marital Deduction in Gift Taxes
Where the gift is to the spouse of the donor, the marital
deduction permits the amount of the gift to be reduced by
one-half.103 If the gift is outright, naturally no question as
to its qualification for the deduction arises. But where it is
in trust, it cannot qualify if it is of a terminable interest.04
The type of interest which is terminable has been discussed
under the marital deduction in the estate tax and since it
is the same in both instances, will not be further discussed
here. A gift, whether in trust or not, cannot qualify for the
marital deduction if it is of a joint interest, with survivor-
ship rights, with any person other than the donor spouse. 105
101. In his Mid-year Economic Report to Congress on July 11, 1949,
President Truman recommended the immediate increase of estate and
gift tax rates so as "to restore the revenue from this source lost under
the Revenue of 1948" (the marital deduction). Promptly after this
recommendation a bill was introduced in Congress to reduce this ex-
emption in gift taxes to $15,000 and to reduce the annual exclusion to
$1,500. Probably this bill will not be enacted, but it is highly probable
that the exemptions and exclusions will be somewhat reduced.
102. There is no South Carolina gift tax. However, it is provided
that all gifts to blood or marriage relatives made by a decedent within
five years of his death are presumed to have been in contemplation of
death. §2480 of the Code.
103. I. R. C., §1,004 (a) (3) (A), and Reg. 108, §86.16a (a).
104. I. R. C., §1,004 (a) (3) (B), and Reg. 108, §86.16a (b) and
86.16b.
105. I. R. C., §1,004 (a) (3) (D).
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If the gift is to a third person, that is, to someone other
than the spouse of the donor, it is considered a gift of one-
half by each spouse. 06 This permits two exemptions and ex-
clusions but in addition, like the split income provisions of
the 1948 Revenue Act, it will permit the gift tax rate to be
that applicable to only one-half of the taxable gift. For ex-
ample, if the net gift is $100,000, by treating it as one-half
by the husband and one-half by the wife the rate of 181/4, %o
applicable to $50,000, instead of the rate of 221 o ap-
plicable to $100,000, would apply. Probably to obtain the
benefit of the lower rate it will be necessary for both the
donor and the spouse to file gift tax returns. While the stat-
ute does not say anything about separate returns being filed,
nor about the tax rate bracket applicable to such gifts, sepa-
rate returns would have to be filed if advantage is taken of
the new Code provisions. The statute does, however, pro-
vide that if the gift is to be treated as one-half by each
spouse, consents must be filed with the Commissioner. 07
Where the donor dies and a gift which has been attri-
buted equally to a husband and wife, is deemed to have
been in contemplation of death, the corporea will probably be
taxed in its entirety in the donor's estate.108
(2) Gifts in Contemplation of Death
If a gift is in contemplation of death, it is included in
the taxable estate of the donor decedent 09 A credit on the
estate tax is given for the gift tax actually paid, but if the
gift is found to have been in contemplation of death, any
estate tax advantage resulting from the gift is wholly lost.
Also lost are the gift tax exemptions and exclusions. More-
over, the property will have the tax "basis" of gift property
rather than inherited property, even though it is taxed as
though it was the latter. This question of basis may be vital-
ly important in connection with gifts and is discussed more
fully in a later section.
What is meant by "contemplation of death"? The Court
and the Treasury Department are not fully agreed on this
106. I. R. C., §1,000 (f).
107. I. R. C., §1,000 (f) (B); 1,000 (f) (2).
108. The Revenue Act of 1948 provides that the donor shall receive
the full credit for the gift tax paid. I. R. C., §813 (a) (2) (C).
109. 1. R. C., §811 (c), and Reg. 105, §81.16.
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question. The Treasury Regulation says in part: (Reg. 105,
Sec. 81.16).
"The phrase "contemplation of death", as used in the
Statute, does not mean, on the one hand that general
expectation of death such as all persons entertain, nor,
on the other, is its meaning restricted to an apprehen-
sion that death is imminent or near. A transfer in con-
templation of death is a disposition of property promt-
ed by the thought of death (though it need not be solely
so prompted). A transfer is prompted by the thought
of death if it is made with the purpose of avoiding the
(estate) tax, or as a substitute for a testamentary dis-
position of the property, or for any other motive as-
sociated with death. The bodily and mental condition
of the decedent and all other attendant facts and cir-
cumstances are to be scruitinized to determine whether
or not such thought prompted the disposition."
From this Regulation, it would seem that where the motive
for a gift includes, among others, that of saving estate taxes,
the gift will be in contemplation of death, even though
avoiding the estate tax was not the controlling or dominant
motive. On the other hand, the Supreme Court has very
clearly indicated that only where the controlling or domi-
nant motive is estate tax avoidance will the gift be in "con-
templation of death".
In United States v. Wells,110 one of the leading cases on the
subject of gifts in contemplation of death, the Supreme Court
said that a gift can be inspired by mixed motives, and that
it should be included in the donor's estate only if the thought
of death was the "controlling motive" for the gift.
"If it is the thought of death, as a controlling motive
prompting the disposition of property, that affords the
test it follows that the statute does not embrace gifts
inter vivos which spring from a different motive."
This decision was re-affirmed in the more recent case of Allen
v. Trust Company of Georgia.m There the gift in trust was
originally made for "life motives" but the donor retained a
"string" which was only relinquished when he found the re-
110. U. S. v. A. C. Wells, 283 U. S. 102.
111. Marion A. Allen v. Trust Co. of Ga., 326 U. S. 630 (1946).
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tamined "string" would make the corpus includible in his es-
tate. In holding the gift not to have been in "contemplation
of death", despite the fact that the "string" was relinquished
only to avoid the estate tax, the Court said that the motive
for the original gift (to protect children from business mis-
adventures) was controlling and reiterated its holding in
United States v. Wells, supra, that for a gift to be in contem-
plation of death, the controlling motive in making the transfer
must be the savings in estate taxes. The Court recognized
that in making a gift the savings of estate taxes are always
considered, saying:
"* * * every man making a gift knows that what
he gives away today will not be included in his estate
when he dies. All such gifts plainly are not made in
contemplation of death in the statutory sense. Many
gifts, even to those who are the natural and appro-
priate objects of the donor's bounty, are motivated by
"purposes associated with life, rather than with the
distribution of property in anticipation of death."
The Tax Court and lower federal courts have consistently
followed the above Supreme Court decisions rather than
the Treasury Regulations so that if a gift was made pri-
marily for reasons associated with "life", it will not be held
to have been in contemplation of death, despite the fact
that consideration was given to the estate tax savings."2
Perhaps a leading motive deemed to be associated with
"life" is the saving of income taxes. A gift made for this
purpose is not considered particularly "commendable" 3 but
the reason is a valid "life motive". n 4 To provide others with
independent incomes adequate for their needs is a sufficient
"life motive", 1 and the fact that they are dependent on
the donor for support, or that they are the object of the
donor's bounty, would not seem to be material. Other rea-
sons for making a gift, which have been held to be "life mo-
112. Blakesree v. Smith, 26 Fed. Supp. 28, aff'd, 110 Fed. (2d) 364
(CCA 2, 1940).
113. See Farmer Loan & Trust Co. v. Bowers, 68 Fed. (2d) 916,
924 (CCA 2, 1934).
114. Estate of J. B. White, 21 BTA 500; Estate of B. P. O'Neal,
6 TCM 713.
115. See Becker v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U. S. 48 (1935);
Proctor v. Hassett, 52 Fed. Supp. 12 (1943).
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tives" rather than "death motives" are: fear of incompe-
tency; 16 prevention or settlement of litigation ;117 fulfillment
of prior promises to children ;118 gifts made in accordance
with an established custom or pursuant to a fixed plan ;' to
equalize gifts to children; 10 to teach the donees to handle
property and to give them experience in business responsi-
bilities; 1' relief from the burden and responsibilities of
business management;m the protection of property against
hazards of age and business ;12 marriage settlements on chil-
dren; m helping a child in a business venture;'2 the edu-
cation of grandchildren.2 6.
Naturally the "life" in question is that of the donor of the
gift. Accordingly it is necessary that he have a reasonable
expectation that his "life" will continue. Thus his age and
health are of importance. 27 Of these two, the health of the
donor, or rather, his state of mind as to his health, is by far
the most important since the life expectancy of even the oldest
person continues until a very advanced age is reached. For
example, in Estate of Oliver Johnson,"2 a gift was held not
to have been in contemplation of death though the donor
was over ninety when the gifts were made. It was mentioned
as of some importance that the donor looked and acted
twelve or fifteen years younger than he actually was. On
the other hand, even if a donor is comparatively young, if
he is suffering from a fatal illness and has knowledge of
that fact, the gift will be included in his estate.m But a
transfer will not be held in contemplation of death where
116. Chemical Bank & Trust Co., 37 BTA 535.
117. Estate of A. H. Dupay, 9 T.C. 276.
118. Estate of Heiver Shausen, 18 BTA 218.
119. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Lucas, 7 Fed. (2d) 146;
Brown v. Commissioner, 74 Fed. (2d) 281 (CCA 10, 1934).
120. True v. U. S., 51 Fed. Supp. 720 (D. C., Wash., 1943).
121. Kroger, 2 T.C.M. 644; Mercantile National Bank v. Thomas,
(D. C. Texas) 41-1 U. S. T. C., para. 10037.
122. Estate of Romberger, 21 BTA 193; Estate of Johnson, 10
T. C. 680.
123. Brown v. Commissioner, 74 Fed. (2d) 281 (CCA 10, 1934).
124. Mather v. MacLaughlin, 57 Fed. (2d) 223 (1932).
125. Commercial National Bank, 36 BTA 239.
126. Estate of Mary Torrance, 6 T.C.M. 1249 (1947).
127. See Paul, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation, Chapter 6.
128. 10 T.C. 680 (1948).
129. Estate of Frank K. Sullivan, 10 T.C. 961 (1948).
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the donor did not know he was in a serious physical con-
dition prior to the gift, even though the gifts were made
within a few months of his death.10
Motives associated with death aside from the savings of
estate taxes have been held to include gifts made for the
purpose of avoiding marital claims upon a proposed re-
marriage.13
1
Important considerations on the question of whether or
not a gift is a substitute for a testamentary disposition are:
Whether the gift was made simultaneously with the execution
of the will. 32 Whether or not the gift represents a "material"
part of the total estate of the donor and whether or not rec-
ognition of the gift is made in the donor's will, such as be-
quests equal to the gift to similar relatives. As a practical
matter the motive and the circumstances are not important
if the gift is made when the donor is comparatively young and
vigorous. However, it will probably be unwise to accumulate
evidence showing the gift not to be in contemplation of death.
Such an accumulation would indicate that some thought was
given to the matter at the time of the gift, and the estate tax
was prominently in the mind of the donor. In Proctor v.
Hassett,1 3 the government argued that memoranda executed
at the time of the gifts, explicily denying that they were
made in contemplation of death, indicated that they were so
made because it showed an awareness of the estate tax con-
sequences of the gifts.
Treasury Regulation 105, Section 81.16 provides that an
inter vivos gift made within two years of the death of the
donor is presumed to have been in contemplation of death
unless the contrary can be shown.
"Any transfer without an adequate and full consider-
ation in money or money's worth, made by the decedent
within two years of his death, of a material part of his
property in the nature of a final disposition or distri-
bution thereof, is, unless shown to the contrary, deemed
to have been made in contemplation of death."
130. Estate of Earnest Hinds, 11 T.C ......... (1948).
131. Estate of B. H. Kroger, 2 T.C.M. 644 (1943).
132. See O'Neal v. Commissioner, 170 Fed. (2d) 596 (CCA 5, October
26, 1948).
133. Proctor v. Hassett, 52 Fed. Supp. 12 (1942).
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The federal estate tax return (form 706) requires the listing
of all such gifts. In addition, it also requires the listing of all
inter vivos gifts of over Five Thousand ($5,000.00) Dollars
regardless of when made, and of all trusts created by the
decedent at any time but which were in effect at his death.
As a practical matter, the two year presumption is unim-
portant since the proof which the executor is required to
produce in order to rebut the presumtion is no greater than
the proof required to show that gifts made before two years
prior to the decedent's death were not in contemplation of
death. However, the South Carolina Code provision that
gifts within five years to relatives by blood or marriage are
presumed to have been in contemplation of death presents
a more difficult question. The language of the statute makes
it seem that the presumption was intended to be conclusive,
but such an interpretation would undoubtedly make the
provision unconstitutional. Because of inadequate enforce-
ment machinery, the State will, in this regard, probably
follow the rulings of the federal government.
As we have seen, gifts made purely to save income taxes
are definitely not "in contemplation of death". But if such
gifts are in trust and the grantor is taxable on the income of
the trust, they fail in that purpose. 34 Where the motive gave
the gift immunity from being held in contemplation of death,
does the immunity continue despite the failure of the motive?
It may be argued that "motive" and "realization" are two
different things; that a "life motive" prompts the transfer
and whatever, occurs thereafter is immaterial. It may be
argued on the other hand, that every one is presumed to
know the law. The Court could say that a motive prompting
a transfer cannot be shown where, because of a failure to
comply with law, that motive or purpose failed. However, the
dominant consideration is the motive prompting the gift. It
would seem under the Code as well as cases that it would
134. The fact that a gift in trust complies with the requirements
of the government so as to escape the estate tax does not necessarily
mean that it is also sufficient to escape the income tax. For example,
where a donor retains a power to direct the trustee in his investments,
the gift, from the income tax standpoint, is nullified, as the donor
remains taxable on the income therefrom. From the estate tax view-
point, however, the gift is complete and the property is not included
in the donor's estate.
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be immaterial what occurred after the motive for the gift
was established.
If a gift is outright and successfully avoids the "con-
templation of death" pitfall, that is the end of the matter.
But if the gift is in trust, the legal requirements for a com-
plete trust must be satisfied. We shall therefore next dis-
cuss those requirements.
(3) Gifts in Trust
As in the case of gifts in contemplation of death, where
a gift tax is paid on a gift in trust but the trust is held to be
ineffective for estate tax purposes, in computing the estate
tax a credit is allowed for the gift tax actually paid."5 Never-
the less, the gift tax exemptions and exclusions are lost and,
although the gift is taxed at the estate tax rates, the prop-
erty has the tax basis of gift property rather than inherited
property.
There are two basic requirements for a complete gift in
trust. They are: First, that the gift not be, directly or indi-
rectly, conditioned on the death of the donor and second, that
the donor not retain, alone or with anyone else, the right to
designate or change beneficiaries, amend, revoke, alter or
terminate the trust, or in any other way affect the bene-
ficial enjoyment of the trust by the beneficiaries.
(i) Income Retained by the Donor:
On January 17, 1949, the Supreme Court decided in the
case of Commissioner v. Church, that a gift in trust with the
grantor reserving a life income from the trust was a transfer
conditioned upon the death of the grantor.8 6 Prior to that
decision, the Court had held on March 2, 1931, in May 'v.
Heiner,"17 that such a trust was not a transfer conditioned
upon the death of the grantor. Although the day after the
May v. Heiner decision, Congress amended the law by a Joint
Resolution to provide that a transfer in trust with a reserved
life income to the grantor was includible in his estate at his
death, it was held that the Joint Resolution was not retro-
active.=s Accordingly, until the Church decision on January
135. Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U. S. 176 (1943).
136. 335 U. S ......... (January 17, 1949).
137. M. ex rel. Mo. Ins. Co. v. Gehner, 281 U. S. 328 (1931).
138. Hassett v. Welch, 303 U. S. 303 (1938).
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17, 1949, a trust created prior to March 3, 1931, was not tax-
able in the grantor's estate merely because he retained the
income therefrom for his lifetime.
However, on October 25, 1949, Congress in effect over-
ruled the Church case by amending Sec. 811 (c) of the In-
ternal Revenue Code. The amendment provides that transfers
made before October 8, 1949 shall not be included in the estate
of the transfer, solely by reason of the transferor retaining
the income from the transfer, if the property would not for
that reason have been included in the estate of the transferor
prior to the Church decision on January 17, 1949.
The distinction heretofore made between (a) a reserved en-
joyment of the property during one's lifetime (such as a re-
served life income), and (b) a transfer conditioned upon one's
death was necessary because of the decision of the Supreme
Court in the May v. Heiner case, supra. This distinction is now,
of course, unnecessary by reason of the Supreme Court's de-
cision in the Church case as well as by the new Act, and has
been removed from the Regulations as to transactions after
the Church decision. As a matter of fact, the distinction
seemed quite nebulous, and May v. Heiner has been character-
ized as "a very sad mistake". 139
If the income or other enjoyment is not actually retained
by the grantor but is used to take care of his legal obligations,
the trust is nevertheless includible in his estate-the grantor
is considered as retaining the income.14° Where the income
may be so used at the election of the beneficiary-dependent,
the same result follows, that is, the trust corporea is included
in the grantor's estate.'4 Where someone other than the bene-
ficiary-dependent has the right to direct the trustee in this
respect, the question is an open one. But probably if the per-
son who has the right to direct the trustee is not "independent"
of the grantor, the corporea will be included in the grantor's
estate, on the theory that if the person who has the right to
direct the trustee is not "independent" his judgment might be
influenced by the grantor. On the other hand, if independent
trustees are given the untrammeled discretion to apply the
139. Paul, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation, 1946 Supp. Chapter
7.23.
140. Helvering v. Mercantile-Commerce & Trust Co., 111 Fed. (2d)
224 (CCA 8, 1940) cert. den'd, 310 U. S. 654.
141. See footnote 140, supra.
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income for the support of the grantor's dependents, the
grantor is not considered as retaining the income and the
corpore will not be included in his estate.'4
If the question is the grantor's liability for income taxes
rather than whether or not the trust will be included in his
estate, the applicable rules are slightly different. If the income
of the trust is specifically ear-marked for the support of the
grantor's dependent, and is used for that purpose, the income
is taxed to the grantor.43 But if the trustee (whether or not
the grantor or whether or not "independent") has discretion
to so apply the income, only the amount of income actually
applied for such purposes is taxed to the grantor.44
(ii) Possibility of Reversion:
Until October 25th of this year, the problem of whether
a gift in trust was includable in the taxable estate of the
donor because of the gift being conditioned on his death if
there existed a "possibility of reverter", was a very active
one. Now, however, this entire problem is moot., On October
25th, an Act'45 known as the "Technical Changes Act of 1949"
was enacted. Section 7 of this Act amends the Internal Rev-
enue Code, Sec. 811 (c), and deals with the problem specifi-
cally. It provides that no transfers in trust prior to October
8, 1949, shall be part of the taxable estate of the grantor be-
cause of a possibility of reverter, where in fact a reverter
did not occur, unless the reversion was expressed, in which
case the trust is includable in the estate only if the reversion
is valued at more than 5% of the trust immediately prior to
the death of the grantor. On transfers of October 8, 1949 and
later, the trust is includable in the estate of the grantor if
the interest of the beneficiaries is conditional upon their sur-
142. Commissioner v. Douglass, 143 Fed. (2d) 961 (CCA 3, 1944).
In distinguishing the facts of the Helvering v. Mercantile-Commerce
& Trust Co., supra, Judge Goodrich said:
"There is certainly an important difference of fact between the
trust set up for the very purpose of providing for the settlor's
legal obligation to his wife and the one in which disinterested
trustees have an option to apply a portion of the income for the
support of the settlor's minor child."
143. See Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U. S. 154, and Douglas v. Willcuts,
296 U. S. 1.
144. 1. R. C., §167 (c).
145. Public Law 378 (H.R. 5268), 81st Congress, 1st Session, Ap-
proved October 25, 1949.
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viving the grantor. Thus, there is no longer any question of
a possibility of reverter.
This act is a legislative overruling of the Spiegel case
which held that if under the State law there could be a failure
of remaindermen and that if upon such failure the trust
corpus would revert to the grantor, the entire corpus is in-
cludible in the grantor's estate as a transfer conditioned
upon his death.
The doctrine of a "possibility of reverter" was first estab-
lished by the Supreme Court in the case of Helvering v. Hal-
lock.146 In that decision the Supreme Court considered a num-
ber of trusts, but they all provided expressly that the trust
should cease and determine, with the corpus payable immedi-
ately to the grantor, if the grantor outlived the beneficiary.
Accordingly many lower federal courts and the Tax Court
at first held that the Hallock decision applied only where the
possibility of reversion was expressed in the trust instru-
ment.147 Later decisions held that this was not the proper cri-
terion and that the Hallock ease did not apply where the possi-
bility of reverter was remote.
148
All doubts as to the application of the Hallock case were
resolved by the Supreme Court in the case of Spiegel.149 There
the Court said that whether or not the reversion is expressed
is immaterial, and that the sole question is whether under the
law of the state, there could be any possibility whatsoever of a
reverter to the grantor. 50
146. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106 (1940).
147. See Commissioner v. Hall's Estate, 153 Fed. (2d) 172 (CCA 2,
1946); 475 (CCA 2, 1946); Commissioner v. Bank of California, 155
Fed. (2d) 1 (CCA 9, 1946).
148. Frances Biddle Trust, 3 TC 832 (1944); Estate of Nina Com-
panari, 5 TC 488 (1945); Estate of Edward P. Hughes, 7 TC 666
(1946); Estate of Lucy B. Platt, 6 TCM ........ (1947) ; see also Marion
v. Glenn (U. S. D. C. of Kentucky, July 28, 1948) 79 Fed. Sup. 96;
see the 1946 Supplement to Paul's Federal Estate and Gift Taxation,
§7.23.
149. 335 U. S. 701, January 17, 1949.
150. In many states a distinction is made between the failure of a
trust created by will and the failure of a trust created inter vivos.
In fact in the Spiegel case, precedents indicating no reversion in the
circumstances there, where the trust was created by will, were brushed
aside by the Court on the ground that there all were concerned with the
failure of trusts created by will. Apparently this distinction is not
recognized in this state. Tyson et al v. Weatherly et al, 214 S. C. 336,
52 S. E. (2d) 410.
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The question of whether or not a "possibility of reversion"
existed in a given situation was at issue in hundreds of cases.
Moreover, this question was in controversy or would have
arisen in many thousands of situations in the future. The
Act of October 25th puts an end to actual litigation as well as
prospective litigation, and eliminates from all future con-
troversy the question of whether or not a transfer involved
a "possibility of reversion".
(iii) Retained Power to Designate or Change Beneficiaries
or to alter or amend:
All gifts in trust with the right retained to designate any
future beneficiary of the trust, whether as to principal or
income, and whether the right to designate such beneficiary
is exercisable individually or as a trustee, either alone or
with any other person whomsoever, renders the entire trust
includible in the estate of the grantor.151 If the right is retained
to designate any beneficiary as to a portion only of the gift,
a corresponding proportion only of the property is includible.152
A necessary corollary with the retained power to designate
future beneficiaries is a gift in trust with the retained power
similarly to change the beneficiaries. This is expressly pre-
cluded. 153 A retained power by the grantor to alter, amend, re-
voke or terminate the trust, whether acting individually or
as trustee, alone or with any other person whomsoever, also
makes the entire trust taxable in the grantor's estate.1 4
But the reserved power to add to the corpus of the trust
and to deal with the mechanics or details of the management
of the trust does not make the property includible in, the es-
tate of the grantor.15 5 Such reserved powers may, however,
cause the income to be taxed to the grantor under the income
tax laws, and this may cause the gift to be nullified from
the estate tax point of view, as a gift in "contemplation of
death". This matter is discussed in the section following the
next one.
(iv) Power to Consume or to Appoint the Remainder:
The consequences of a power in the beneficiary to consume
151. I. R. C., §811 (d), Reg. 105, §81.15, 81.19 and 81.20.
152. Reg. 105, §81.19.
153. Reg. 105, §81.20.
154. I. R. C., §811 (d), Reg. 105, §81.15 and 81.20.
155. Estate of Johnson, 2 TCM 299; Estate of Fisk, 5 TCM 42, see
Estate of Storer, 41 BTA 1156.
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the principal of an inter vivos trust, or to appoint the remain-
der interest, where the grantor is neither the beneficiary nor
a trustee, are the same in the case of an inter vivos trust as
in the case of a testamentary trust. However, where the bene-
ficiary is the grantor,156 any right to principal or income,
which is not discretionary with an independent trustee, is con-
sidered a retained right which would make the corpus includi-
ble in the grantor's estate.157 If the grantor is a trustee, an
untrammeled discretionary power in the trustees to invade
the principal on behalf of beneficiaries is a retained power
which will make the entire trust includible in the grantor's
estate. On the other hand, if the power to invade is conditioned
upon a sufficiently definite "external standard" to permit a
Court of Equity to compel invasion, it is not includible in the
grantor's estate. 58 Where the grantor is not a trustee, if the
trustees are independent and have absolute discretion as to
the payment of corpus, the fund will not be included in the
estate of the grantor.159 A discretionary power in trustees to
pay income to the grantor-beneficiary would seem also to be
exempt.160
(v) Incame Tax Liability Upon the Creation of an Inter Vivos
Trust (Clifford Regulations) :
Prior to the decision of the United States Supreme Court
in Helvering v. Clifford,'6' in 1940, persons with substantial
investment incomes had often created short-term trusts for
members of their family, making themselves or their wives'
156. In South Carolina a trust established for oneself is void. §9037
of the South Carolina Code of 1942.
157. Toeller v. Commissioner, 165 Fed. (2d) 665 (CCA 7, 1948);
Blunt v. Kelly, 131 Fed. (2d) 632 (CCA 3, 1942); Estate of Ida Rosen-
wasser, 5 TC 1943 (1945).
158. Jennings v. Smith, 161 Fed. (2d) 74 (CCA 2, 1947); Estate of
Milton Budlong, 7 TC 756.
159. Commissioner v. Irving Trust Co., 147 Fed. (2d) 946 (CCA
2, 1945) there the Court said:
"We have found no decision in which a settlor has parted with
power to control the application of any part of the corpus and the
disposition of it is left to the judgment of the trustee, independent
of any prescribed standards, and yet the corpus has been in-
cluded in the estate because the settlor might receive a part of
the corpus through the exercise of an uncontrolled discretion by
the trustee."
160. Herzog v. Commissioner, 116 Fed. (2d) 591 (CCA 2, 1941).
161. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 (1940).
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trustees. In this way they would split their income among
their family members, lower the applicable tax rates and a
smaller aggregate tax was paid. The Clifford case, however,
put an end to this practice. There the Supreme Court held
that such a trust was ineffective and that the income there-
from was nevertheless taxable to the grantor. Mr. Clifford
had established a trust for his wife which was to continue
five years, at which time the trust corpus was to revert to
him, and he himself was the trustee. The Supreme Court held
that in view of the short-term of the trust, and as Mr. Clifford
had retained such a substantial "administrative control", he
was, in substance, the owner of the trust property, and the
income should be taxed to him and not to his wife.
The Treasury, using this decision as its authority, intro-
duced an extremely broad Regulation (Reg. 111, Sec. 29.22
(a) -21) which taxes to the grantor of a trust all income there-
from, (a) where the trust is for a term not greater than ten
years (fifteen years under certain circumstances) or (b)
where the grantor, or someone else not having a substantial
adverse interest, has the power to appoint future beneficiaries
of the corpus or income therefrom or (c) where the grantor,
or someone else not having a substantial adverse interest, has
a measure of administrative control over the trust.
The Clifford Regulations draw a sharp distinction between
the right of an independent trustee to designate future bene-
ficiaries and such a reserved right in the grantor, or in some-
one else lacking a substantial adverse interest. 6 2 Where there
is an independent trustee, the latter may apportion and pay
out or accumulate income or principal, in his discretion, so
long as the beneficiaries are within a named class, without
the income being taxable to the grantor. But a similar reserved
power in the grantor, or in someone lacking a substantially
adverse interest, must be confined to accumulate for a bene-
ficiary who is either a minor or under a legal disability or to
apportion income only when the trust instrument provides a
reasonable definite external standard based on the needs and
circumstances of the beneficiaries.
Where the grantor, or anyone else lacking a substantial
162. Estate of Johnson, supra. The Clifford Regulations disregard the
separate entities of certain members of the same family group. How-
ever, all family members are likely to be held ineligible to be an in-
dependent trustee.
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adverse interest, has administrative control over the trust,
which can be used for the benefit of the grantor, the grantor
is taxable on the income therefrom under the Clifford Regula-
tion. The Regulation specifically says that administrative con-
trol in the following respects makes the grantor taxable on
the income of the trust:
(a) Either the grantor (in any capacity), or another per-
son lacking a substantial adverse interest, has power to trans-
fer the trust property for less than an adequate consideration.
(b) Either the grantor (in any capacity), or another per-
son lacking a substantial adverse interest, has power to bor-
row any part of the trust corpus or trust income without
adequate security or interest and, in any event, has not re-
paid the trust before the end of the taxable year.
(c) Either the grantor (in a non-fiduciary capacity only),
or another person lacking a substantial adverse interest (non-
fiduciary), has the power to vote stock and control the trust
investments.
(d) Either the grantor (in any capacity), or someone
lacking a substantial adverse interest, has the right to re-
acquire the trust corpus by substituting "other property of
an equivalent value".
(4) Liability for the Gift Tax
When a gift is not within the annual exclusion and a gift
tax return must be filed, both the donor and the donee are re-
quired to file a return-the donor must file a donor return
and the donee must file a donee return.163 The tax, if any is
payable, should be paid by the donor but the donee is sec-
ondarily liable for the tax up to the value of the property.164
The property given away is subjected to a ten-year tax lien
for the payment of the tax, but this lien is divested in the case
of a bona fide sale. 65 The responsibility of the donee to pay
the tax if the donor does not do so is not altered by the fact
that the gift is included in the estate of the donor. While the
estate fiduciary is required primarily to pay the tax on the
gift property as well as the tax on the other property in the
estate, it is entirely conceivable that the estate will not have
163. I. R. C., §1006 and 1007 and Reg 108, §86.20 and 86.21.
164. I. R. C., §1009; Reg. 108, §86.35.
165. See footnote 164 supra.
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sufficient funds to pay this additional tax-especially if the
gift was of a substantial part of the property of the decedent.16
When gift property is included in the estate of the donor,
as a gift in "contemplation of death" or as a gift by an in-
complete trust, it is included in the estate at its value at the
date of death (or one year thereafter if the executor chooses
the optional valuation date pursuant to Sec. 811 (j) of the
Code) and this value might be greater or less than the gift
tax value. If the estate value of the property is less than the
gift value, the estate obtains an advantage as the credit for
the gift tax paid may be greater than the estate tax actually
due on such property. If the gift tax were paid by the donee
however, he is not given the right of recoupment against the
estate fiduciary. If, on the other hand, the property has in-
creased in value from the date of gift to the estate valuation
date, there may be a substantially greater tax due than the
credit. And this, of course, will always be true where the
property was non-taxable as a gift. The donee, however, re-
mains secondarily liable for the greater tax.16 7 The fact that
the donee is also liable for the tax on the gift means that in
every case where a gift is made, the donee has a contingent
tax liability until the death of the donor and the estate tax
is paid.168 The fact that the property has been lost or disposed
of by the donee of the gift before the donor's death is
irrelevant.
69
(5) The "Basis" of Gift Property
The "basis" of property sold or otherwise disposed of is
highly important to the seller. The profit or loss from such
sale or other disposition is probably includible in the income
tax of the owner; and it depends entirely upon the "basis"
of the property. The Code provides that if the property was
purchased its basis is its cost (subject to adjustment for capi-
tal charges, depreciation and the like) ; if it were inherited its
basis is its value at the time of the death of the former owner;
if it were received by gift its basis is that of the former owner
unless a loss is claimed, in which case its basis is the value
166. See an excellent general discussion of this question, by Alvin
R. Cowan, "A Hazard of Gifts in Contemplation of Death," 26 Taxes
134 (February, 1948).
167. Milliken v. U. S., 283 U. S. 15.
168. I. R. C., §827 (b), Reg. 105, §81.99.
169. Humphrey v. Commissioner, 162 Fed. (2d) 1 (CCA 5, 1947).
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at the time of the gift or the donor's basis, whichever is
lower.
7 0
However, rulings and court decisions have resulted in some
important variations of these general Code provisions which
may be highly significant in developing an estate plan. While
the general problems of basis will not be discussed here,1'7
the more significant variations will be mentioned in the next
paragraph.
If property is bequeathed or devised with a direction for
its sale at a specified price, or at a price which can be de-
veloped from a stated formula, its basis will not be its value
at the death of the former owner, but will be the specified or
formula price.17 2 The fact that estate tax was paid on its date
of death value is immaterial. If the property were owned by
the decedent in a joint tenancy with someone else, with the
right of survivorship, the basis of the portion contributed by
the decedent is not its value when the decedent died, but rather
its cost.173 That the estate tax paid was based on the value of
the property at the date of death of the decedent (joint
owner) is immaterial here also. The fact that property pre-
viously given away inter vivos is included in the estate of the
donor because it is deemed to have been given away in "con-
templation of death" or by an incomplete trust, is insufficient
to permit the property to have the basis of its estate valua-
tion. 7 4 Where a testator by will gives a son the right to pur-
chase assets of the estate at greatly below its value, the basis
of the property to the son will not be its estate value but his
actual cost.'7 5 Where a legatee accepts estate assets in lieu of
a cash legacy or of a bequest, his basis for the property ac-
quired is not its value but is the value of the bequest or legacy
surrendered in exchange for it.176
170. I. R. C., §113 (a).
171. The author has discussed this problem elsewhere in some detail
"Basis Problems", 27 Taxes 875 (October, 1949).
172. Delone v. Commissioner, 6 TC 1188.
173. Lang v. Commissioner, 289 U. S. 109 (1933).
174. Wurlitzer v. Commissioner, 81 Fed. (2d) 928 (CCA 6, 1936);
Everett v. Commissioner, 4 TCM 454 (1945).
175. Mack v. Commissioner, 148 Fed. (2d) 62 (CCA 3, 1945), cert.
den'd, 326 U. S. 719.
176. Commissioner v. Matheson, 82 Fed. (2d) 380 (CCA 2, 1940);
Suisman v. Eaton, 15 Fed. supp. 113 (D. C. Conn., 1936) aff'd, 83 Fed.
(2d) 1019, CCA 2, cert. den'd, 299 U. S. 573; Commissioner v. Brincher-
hoff, 168 Fed. (2d) 436 (CCA 2, 1948).
61
Bruton: Estate Planning
Published by Scholar Commons, 1949
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
The rule that property given away inter vivos in contem-
plation of death or by incomplete trust has the basis of gift
property rather than inherited property, although taxed as
part of the estate, is an important factor to consider on the
question of whether a gift should be made. If there is some
danger of the gift being nullified for either of these two rea-
sons, and the property has increased greatly in value since it
was acquired, probably the gift should not be made. Naturally
this would not be a factor if the property is in trust and cannot
be sold or disposed of by the donee of the gift. On the other
hand, if the property has decreased substantially in value and
can be disposed of by the donee, it should by all means be given
instead of bequeathed or devised. It will retain its high basis,
despite the gift being nullified for estate tax purposes, and
upon its disposition the income tax of the recipient will be
much less.
(d) Conclusion as to Estate Tax:
If a gift in trust is sufficiently complete so as not to be in-
cludible in the estate of the donor because of being conditioned
on his death or of a "string" retained by him, and there is no
contemplation of death question, the beneficiary can be given
a limited power of appointment over the remainder, and the
trustee can be given the discretionary right to make such pay-
ments to the beneficiary from principal as the trustee deems
appropriate, and the fund will not be included in the estate of
the donor, nor will it be included in the estate of the donee.
If a gift is outright and there is no contemplation of death
question, it escapes estate tax in the estate of the donor but
not in the estate of the donee. Moreover, substantial income
tax savings, in either case may be realized. On the other hand,
where a testamentary trust is created, while it is taxable in
the estate of the testator, it is not taxable in the estates of
the beneficiaries (unless the beneficiaries can, at their pleas-
ure, consume the principal).
The question frequently arises, where there is a specific
bequest, as to where the burden of the estate and inheritance
taxes shall fall. The state inheritance tax is based upon the
value of the bequest, so naturally it is payable from the be-
quest. On the other hand, the federal tax is upon the estate.
Whether or not it should be apportioned among the bene-
ficiaries is a matter to be determined by the state law.'7
177. Riggs v. G. delDrago, et al., Exrs., 317 U. S. 95 (1942).
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Although many states, in the absence of specific testamentary
directions, require the tax to be apportioned among the bene-
ficiaries in accordance with the value of bequests to them,
in this state there is no such requirement and, in the absence
of testamentary directions, the tax must be paid out of the
general residuary estate.178
A factor which should be considered is that of the "com-
mon disaster" provision in statutes and in wills or trusts in-
struments. This state now has the uniform Simultaneous
Death Act, but by its terms, it does not apply if there are will
provisions on this question.179 Many wills do include a pro-
vision for the eventuality of the simultaneous deaths of the
testator and a beneficiary. The statute, and most will clauses
on this question, provide that in the event of simultaneous
deaths the testator shall be presumed to have survived. Now,
in view of the marital deduction, which applies only if a
decedent is survived by a spouse, it might be desirable to in-
clude in a will a provision that is just the opposite from the
usual common disaster provision; namely, that if a testator
and spouse die in or from a common disaster, it shall be pre-
sumed that the spouse survives the testator. The Statute would
not be a deterrent, since it does not apply if the will provides
for this eventuality. The new Treasury Regulation under the
marital deduction, indicates that such a presumption would be
recognized. 8 9 The effectiveness of such a presumption, how-
ever, might be limited to bequests, and not apply in the case
of a power of appointment.' 8 ' But if there are no children or
joint heirs of the spouses, probably the usual common disaster
provision will be more acceptable, regardless of tax conse-
quences. If the spouse is presumed to survive the decedent,
the marital deduction will be available, but the estate would
178. CCH. Federal Estate and Gift Taz Repo'ter, §3140 et seq.
179. Adopted on April 3, 1948; see the excellent discussion of this
new Act by James M. Perry, Esq. of the Greenville Bar in 1, SOUTH
CARoLINA LAW QUARTERLY 64.
180. Reg. 105, §81.47a.
181. In Matter of Fowles, 222 N. Y. 222, a power of appointment
given by the will of one spouse to the other, and exercised by the will
of the other, was upheld despite the simultaneous deaths of both spouses.
In states other than New York, however, it is open to question as to
whether a presumption as to survivorship will be effective where a
power of appointment is involved; especially where the power involves
real property. This might be important in the case of a power of
appointment which will qualify a bequest for the marital deduction.
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be inherited by the spouse's, rather than the decedent's family.
Another factor to consider is that where a gift is made
the tax benefits may be entirely lost if the amount of the gift
comes back to the donor by inheritance. Thus, when the donor
may in the future inherit property from the donee, the latter
should provide for a testamentary trust in a will so that there
is no danger of the donor inheriting the gift property. It is
also advisable for an insurance policy, which the insured
neither owns nor on which he has paid the premiums since
January 10, 1941, to be kept out of the ownership of the in-
sured. Thus, if a wife buys and owns insurance on the life
of her husband, it is advisable for her to provide for the suc-
cession of ownership or to bequeath the policy to someone
other than the husband, who is able to pay the premiums on
the policy. Of if that is not expedient, it is advisable for the
wife to leave the policy to a trustee and also leave the trustee
sufficient funds to continue paying the premiums until that
responsibility can be taken over by the beneficiary.
6. GENERAL CONCLUSION:
In preparing an estate plan it should be kept in mind that
while the applicable law concerning the administration of an
estate is likely to remain constant, the field of tax law has
been highly changeable, and probably in the future it will con-
tinue to be so. An illustration has already been given of the
great changes in the income and estate tax rates in the last
eighteen years. But in 1931, there was no gift tax whatsoever.
Before 1940 the problems of making an inter vivos gift suf-
ficient to avoid the income tax, as well as the estate tax, pre-
sented no great difficulties. The administrative control and
broad decisions as to requirements for completeness in
inter vivos gifts designed to nullify the income as
well as the estate tax benefits of a gift, have come about
entirely since the Clifford and Hallock decisions, which were
in 1940. Prior to 1942, an unexercised power of appointment
was not subjected to the estate tax and a beneficiary could
consume the principal of a trust without any unused portions
being taxable in the beneficiary's estate. Prior to 1948, there
was no marital deduction.
Recognition must be accorded to the present pronounced
trend of Congress, the Treasury Department and the Courts,
in tax matters, to treat the family as an economic unit. The
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Clifford Regulations were inspired in large measure by an
awareness of the economic unity of husband and wife. The
distinction between a family trustee and an independent trus-
tee runs through the Court decisions on such matters as in-
vasion of trust principal and the appointment and change of
beneficiaries of trusts. The "marital deduction" in both the
estate and gift tax is based on the theory that husband and
wife are co-owners of the family wealth. The split income of
the 1948 Act is also a recognition of this fact as applied to
income.
Any plan designed primarily to avoid or minimize taxes
may be ineffective within the next few years. A sound estate
plan must, therefore, be designed primarily to accomplish
aims other than the reduction of taxes. But where the plan
is sound in other respects, consideration is proper of all meth-
ods which may be utilized to bring about the largest possible
tax savings, bearing in mind the trend as well as the current
estate tax law. Furthermore, any such plan should be reviewed
periodically. For example, the 1948 Revenue Act undoubtedly
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